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RIDING INTO THE SUNSET IN A “POST-RACIAL” WORLD:
LESSONS IN EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS SCHEMES IN FRANCE AND THE
UNITED STATES
by KRISTEN BARNES *
“[If affirmative action] conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension
is original Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitutionally
conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it is part of the
Amendment’s very nature until complete equality is achieved in the
area.” 1
-Justice Blackmun
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.” 2
-Justice Roberts
“We must invent methods that are faithful to and conform with our
traditions, without categorizing individuals by race, ethnicity,
religion. . . . It’s quite complex.” 3
-Eric Besson, French Immigration Minister

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School;
Ph.D. Duke University. I would like to thank Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, Charles Lawrence III,
Tracy Thomas, Peter Gerhart, Jessica West, Harold J. Krent, the participants of the Law and Society
Conference (2012), the participants of the Albany Law School Sharing Scholarship and Building
Teachers Workshop (2012), the participants of the Central States Law Schools Association Annual
Conference (2011), the participants of the University of Kentucky Developing Ideas Conference (2011),
and the participants of the Midwest People of Color Conference (2010) for their generous comments.
Also, I owe thanks to Chelsey Greene who provided excellent research assistance. Finally, I would like
to thank the entire faculty of the University of Akron School of Law.
1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 405 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
2. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality
opinion).
3. Cécilia Gabizon, Yazid Sabeg veut plus d'élus issus de la diversité; ÉGALITÉ En pleine
obamania, le commissaire à la diversité veut prendre des photos pour mesurer la progression des
minorités visibles. Une idée qui ne séduit guère Éric Besson, nouveau ministre de l'Immigration, LE
FIGARO (Fr.), Jan. 21, 2009, at 11 (trans. Kristen Barnes).
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INTRODUCTION
Even in a “post-racial” world, race matters, especially when it comes to
educational opportunity. French and American constitutional structures abhor and
deny this reality, even though divisions along ethno-racial lines are apparent. A
method of addressing the divisions in educational opportunity without running
afoul of constitutional proscriptions is to use proxy strategies. 4 As unlikely as it
seems, an elite French university and the State of Texas have adopted measures that
have remarkable similarities. Though they accomplish certain goals, neither
program will be successful in addressing racial imbalances without directly
addressing race.
France and the United States provide interesting cases of comparison for
several reasons. First, both nations have substantial ethno-racial minority
populations that challenge majoritarian notions of national identity, equality and
access. 5 How the minority populations within these exceptional nations fare in
relation to the majority population matters and has an impact that transcends

4. See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France: The Case of Higher
Education, Remarks given at the 4th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development 7 (Dec.
18, 2008), http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_08_conf/PanelDiscussion.html (click “Affirmative
Action in the United States and France: The Cost of Higher Education” hyperlink to download the file)
[hereinafter Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France] (defining the term
“substitution strategy” as a “strategy by which what looks like a secondary effect of a facially neutral
distributive rule is in fact the reason why that rule has been enacted, in a context where pursuing the
decision-maker’s true objective in a more straightforward manner . . . without using the neutral rule as a
proxy, would be considered illegitimate”).
5. See generally George M. Fredrickson, Race, Ethnicity, and National Identity in France and the
United States: A Comparative Historical Overview, Paper given at the Fifth Annual Gilder Lehrman
Center International Conference at Yale University, Collective Degradation: Slavery and the
Construction of Race 11-24 (November 7-8, 2003), www.yale.edu/glc/events/race/Fredrickson.pdf
(discussing the types of ethno-racial minorities in both the United States and France and comparing and
contrasting the evolution of each country’s respective public policies and attitudes affecting these ethnoracial minorities).
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national borders. 6 Second, both France and the United States, historically, have
imported people of color to address their labor needs. 7 Third, in terms of identity,
both nations have represented themselves as white. 8 Fourth, the United States and
France have touted themselves as uniquely exceptional nations serving as stellar
examples of civilization and democracy. 9 Fifth, there appears to be a convergence
between the trend in United States equality education jurisprudence, which
advocates a move toward so-called “race-neutral” alternatives, 10 and the interest of

6. Newspapers worldwide gave attention to the election of Barack Obama as President. In France,
Germany, and other countries one question that was loudly voiced is, “Where is our Obama?” See Luc
Bronner, Où est l'Obama français ? : L’ascension, loin de la politique [Where is the French Obama?
Progress, Far from Politics], LE MONDE (Fr.), Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/electionsamericaines/article/2008/10/29/l-ascension-loin-de-la-politique_1112400_829254.html, (explaining that
almost no minority role models exist in the political realm in France, but that French minorities instead
look to the private sector for examples of professional success); Max Colchester, France Rethinks
ST.
J.,
Nov.
6,
2008,
Relations
with
Minorities,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122591006614902049.html (“A sense of envy at America’s electoral
feat is being felt across Europe, where no nation has elevated a racial minority to its highest office.”);
Letters to the Editor, How Will Obama Govern?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/news/10iht-edlet.1.17688801.html (describing the reactions of
citizens in other countries after the election of president Obama, and how several Canadian citizens have
asked news outlets “where is our Obama”); Andries Louw, South Africa’s Leadership Crisis,
NEXTCHURCH (Nov. 7, 2008), http://nextchurch.wordpress.com/2008/11/07/south-africas-leadershipcrisis/ (discussing an article in South Africa’s Daily Sun entitled “Where is Our Obama”, which
describes South Africa’s belief that they need a leader similar to Obama); see also Karine Lambin, 80%
des Français prêt à voter pour un Noir? [80% of the French are Ready to Vote for A Black Man?], LE
MONDE (Fr.), Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2008/11/03/80-des-francais-prets-avoter-pour-un-noir_1114239_3224.html (explaining that, in a survey of French citizens, 80% of
respondents said they would be willing to vote for a black candidate for president, while only 47% of
respondents actually believed a black candidate could be elected in France); Nicolas Sarkozy Veut
Avancer Sur la Discrimination Positive [Nicolas Sarkozy Wants to Move Forward with Affirmative
Action], LE MONDE (Fr.), Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2008/12/17/nicolassarkozy-veut-avancer-sur-la-discrimination-positive_1132028_3224.html [hereinafter Sarkozy Veut
Avancer] (discussing how French president Nicolas Sarkozy reopened the issue of affirmative action in
France as a result of Obama’s election).
7. See Fredrickson, supra note 5, at 2, 12 (noting that both France and the United States engaged in
the slave trade and the use of slave labor and that “both the United States and France were immigrantreceiving societies that required massive importation of foreign labor to industrialize themselves in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”).
8. See Saran Donahoo, Reflections on Race: Affirmative Action Policies Influencing Higher
Education in France and the United States, 110 TCHRS. C. REC. 251, 271 (2008) (“In France, immigrant
status and heritage consistently establish non-Whites as non-French. Although many people of color in
the United States have been in the country long enough to discard or simply outgrow their immigrant
identities, the physical and cultural markers of race afford them only second-class citizenship status.”).
9. See ALICE L. CONKLIN, A MISSION TO CIVILIZE: THE REPUBLICAN IDEA OF EMPIRE IN FRANCE
AND WEST AFRICA 1895-1830 11-37 (1997) (discussing French ideological views on democracy and its
civilizing mission). See generally UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL
NATION (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008) (relating perspectives on American
exceptionalism from different scholars).
10. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003) (holding that institutions of higher
education should periodically review their admissions policies to determine whether or not racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve diversity, and that in twenty-five years “the use of racial
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the French government in identifying equality strategies that will help them
improve the dire socio-economic condition of certain ethno-racial minorities (for
example, individuals of African heritage) without specifically referencing ethnicity
or race in the language of the policies. 11 Sixth, the timing of France’s move to
implement affirmative action policies, which comes nearly fifty years after the
United States’ move, provides an interesting contrast. France is just beginning the
process of formulating programs that are intended to ensure that its multi-ethnic
population, with emphasis on its marginalized population of African descent, is
fully incorporated into the fabric of the country. 12 For France this issue is a
relatively new one from the standpoint of the nation’s political and legal discourse.
For the United States, the question of the full inclusion of minorities has a long
history. Seventh, because both nations concentrate on education as a means to
change the status quo of the substantial divide between the haves and the havenots, 13 it makes sense to examine the strategies adopted by both to effect change
and the legal environments that shape these efforts. Eighth, there are lessons that
each republic can learn from the other. Placing France and the United States side by
side in the mode of grappling with the common issue of how to achieve equality of
educational opportunity should allow for some useful insights that can positively
inform the educational policies of both nations for the future.
Academic institutions and governments in both countries have recognized that

preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (argued Oct. 10, 2012)
(No. 11-345) (“Grutter requires that any race-conscious measures must have a ‘logical end point’ and be
‘limited in time.’ This durational requirement can be satisfied by sunset provisions or by periodic
reviews to reconsider whether there are feasible race-neutral alternatives that would achieve diversity
interests ‘about as well.’ In this respect, Grutter is best seen not as an unqualified endorsement of racial
preferences, but as a transient response to anemic academic diversity.”).
11. See, e.g., Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 7
(explaining that although the “color-blind” admission policies of the elite French university, Sciences
Po, “officially embodies an area-based and class-based approach of affirmative action, [it] may also be
understood as indirectly and implicitly targeting groups that . . . would be considered as ‘ethnic’ or
‘racial’ minorities, in particular the group of second-generation North African immigrants”).
12. See generally Alec G. Hargreaves, Half-Measures: Anti-Discrimination Policy in France, in
RACE IN FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 227 (Herrick
Chapman & Laura L. Frader eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hargreaves, Half-Measures] (examining the policy
goals of France’s integration policies to combat racial discrimination and calling into question the
effectiveness of these measures); ALEC G. HARGREAVES, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE: IMMIGRATION,
POLITICS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 196 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter HARGREAVES, MULTI-ETHNIC
FRANCE] (discussing the French policy of “Positive Discrimination” in education and housing as it
applies to racial and ethnic minorities).
13. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Top French Schools, Asked to Diversify, Fear for Standards, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/world/europe/01ecoles.html (discussing the
consequences of France’s “Charter of Equal Opportunity” which asks its elite universities to “set a goal
of increasing the percentage of scholarship students to 30 percent” to help “smart children of the poor
overcome . . . huge cultural disadvantages”). See generally Lynn W. Huntley, Foreword to EBONI M.
ZAMANI-GALLAHER ET AL., THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON CAMPUS xi, xiii (2009)
(discussing the purpose of affirmative action programs in education as a “means to gain resources,
power, and influence”).
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education plays a substantial role for individuals in obtaining employment and
being able to pursue a meaningful career. The current rhetoric emanating from
France 14 and the United States 15 suggests that equal educational opportunity is an
important goal. American and French institutions of higher learning often advance
moral arguments asserting that it is the responsibility of schools to be open to all
members of its society and to cultivate racial and ethnic diversity within this realm.
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s words are
exemplary of this sentiment: “[Access to a college or university] must be inclusive
of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all
members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational
institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in
America.” 16
Sounding in a similar register, former French Education Minister Jack Lang
has spoken favorably of the Priority Education Agreements, or CEP, program 17 at
the Institut d’études politiques de Paris’ (“Sciences Po”), 18 noting that the CEP
program addresses “the need for a democratic country to diversify the social origin
of its elites.” 19 Comments made by Richard Descoings, former Director of Sciences

14. See, e.g., John Thornhill, Ministerial Rivalry Clouded Early Response to French Riots, FIN.
TIMES,
Nov.
8,
2005,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a26ea32-4ffc-11da-8b720000779e2340.html#axzz298uArI00 (recounting the message then French President Jacques Chirac had
for protesters in the wake of the civil unrest in October 2005) (“Those who want to sow violence or fear
will be caught, tried, and punished . . . . But we also understand very well that we must move towards
respect for each individual, justice and equality of opportunity. We are all completely determined to go
down this road and pursue the efforts that are already underway in this domain.” (emphasis added)).
France also created the post of Minister for Equal Opportunity, to which the writer Azouz Begag was
appointed. See Mélina Gazsi, Azouz Begag: An Exemplary Path, FRANCE IN THE U.K.: FRENCH
EMBASSY, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Integration-Azouz-Begag-an.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012)
(describing Azouz Begag’s rise from a low income minority family, and his current goal of equalizing
opportunities for people of all races in France).
15. See, e.g., Huntley, supra note 13, at xi (“It is the institutional arrangements, policies, and
practices based upon race, gender, and other characteristics that still operate as built-in headwinds,
blocking the success and upward mobility of people stuck at the bottom. It is the nation’s massive failure
to provide low-income people and members of minority groups with equal and fair access to quality
education. Formal equal opportunity can do little good if people lack equal access to educational
opportunities that would allow them to take advantage of this policy.”).
16. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33.
17. This program is known in French as the Conventions Education Prioritaire program. Brochure,
Sciences Po, Objective: Equal Opportunity—The Priority Education Agreements 1 (2011),
http://www.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/Equal%20Opportunity%20and%20Diversity%20Program%2
02011.pdf [hereinafter Priority Education Agreements Brochure].
18. The English translation of the school’s name is The Institute of Political Studies of Paris,
commonly referred to in French and English as “Sciences Po.” See generally SCIENCES PO,
http://www.sciencespo.fr/en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (English version of Sciences Po website).
19. John Vinocur, Affirmative Action Recruiting for Top Schools Startles French Elite, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 31, 2001, at 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/31/news/31ihtfrance_ed3__2.html (citation omitted); see also Erlanger, supra note 13 (explaining that the result of the
admissions system before the Priority Education Agreements was a “self-perpetuating elite of the
wealthy and white, who provide their own children the social skills, financial support and cultural
knowledge to pass the entrance exams”).
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Po, often emphasize the “social responsibility” of France’s elite universities to
address socio-economic disparities. 20 Descoings explains:
[I]n France, it is by gaining admission into one of these few top
schools (the major engineering and business schools, along with the
École normale supérieure and Sciences Po) that you eventually get
to the most elite positions, not only in the business world, but also in
public administration, the media, and the cultural sphere . . . . those
people who have not gone through one of these schools will have a
very hard time pushing through the glass ceiling found in [those
sectors]. 21

The foregoing statements suggest that, as a matter of fundamental fairness, it
is the responsibility of society to ensure that substantial and meaningful
opportunities for quality education are presented to a broad swath of people and
where those opportunities appear to be lacking (for example, for certain ethnoracial minorities and lower-income individuals), active steps must be taken to
address the inequities.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and compare two strategies designed
to promote ethno-racial 22 inclusion that were initiated in France and the United
States in the context of higher education. 23 In particular, I examine the Priority
Education Agreements Program or CEP, an innovative affirmative action program
which was implemented in 2001 by the Sciences Po, one of France’s elite

20. See Suzanne Daley, Elite French College Tackles Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/04/world/elite-french-college-tackles-affirmative-action.html (“The
director of Sciences Po, Richard Descoings, said it was obvious to him that coming up with a way of
diversifying the student body had to be a priority. ‘Here at Sciences Po is where we form our elite for
both business and government,’ he said. 'When you have that responsibility, it is impossible not to ask
yourself who is coming here. We thought about our social responsibility and we decided we had to do
something.’”).
21. Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Richard Descoings, Dir. of Sciences Po, FRENCH-AM.
FOUND.,
1,
(Feb.
2,
2010),
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/descoingstranscript_en.pdf [hereinafter Interview
with Richard Descoings].
22. Even though, in the context of this article, I extensively use the terms “race” and “ethnicity” to
apply to groups that are not Caucasian, I recognize that “race” applies to Caucasian people and that a
variety of different ethnic groups may be categorized as “white.” I find the definition of “ethnic group”
offered by legal scholars Juan Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, Jean Stefancic, and Stephanie
Wildman useful. These authors define “ethnic group” as “a group of people larger than an extended
family whose boundaries are marked by a social practice or experience perceived as distinct: a history or
a religion; customs or traditions; a language or alphabet; perhaps even a geography.” JUAN F. PEREA, ET
AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 5 (2000).
23. In this article, I do not focus on integration and diversity schemes at the elementary and high
school levels. That topic will be the subject of a future law review article. Even though the Texas Top
Ten Percent plan looks to the performance results of high school students, my discussion is concerned
with the implementation of the program at the college and university level and its effectiveness in that
realm given the goals stated.
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universities, 24 in relation to the Texas Ten Percent Plan that was established in 1997
in the United States by the State of Texas. 25
Sections I and II of this paper will provide the historical and social contexts in
which the proxy strategies created by Sciences Po and the State of Texas emerged.
I then develop the fundamental points of my argument which are that: (1) race and
ethnicity still “matter” 26 and will need to be considered in the administration of
college and graduate admissions programs despite the declaration, which I dispute,
that American society has entered a post-racial era and France’s continued
celebration of its egalitarian principles at the expense of the attainment of
substantive equality; (2) to the extent that laws permit the consideration of ethnicity
and race in the United States, they should be retained for as long as necessary to
accomplish equal education opportunities and meaningful access to higher
education; (3) where laws permitting an express consideration of ethno-racial
factors do not exist, as is the case in France, the issue of amending the relevant
laws should be revisited to allow for an express consideration of these
classifications to facilitate the creation of effective affirmative action approaches;
(4) proxy strategies are to be encouraged because they are effective, to some
degree, in achieving diversity and improving access to higher education for
underrepresented ethnic and racial minority groups, and because they are politically
palatable and legally viable for accomplishing the stated goals in the United States
and France; and (5) while creative approaches such as proxies should be pursued, it
is important to build some flexibility into the strategies and not to over rely on them
particularly if it becomes apparent that they are not functioning to allow for the
admission of a “critical mass” 27 of underrepresented ethno-racial minorities to
higher education institutions.
In connection with my analysis of how the Sciences Po and Texas have
navigated certain constitutional issues with respect to the implementation and
maintenance of the specific admission schemes I examine, I rely upon select laws
and legal cases for each country. In addressing the French constitutional issues, in
Section III I examine one of the decisions rendered by France’s high legal advisory

24. See Donahoo, supra note 8, at 262-63 (defining the CEP program and describing generally its
purpose and implementation).
25. See MARTA TIENDA, ET AL., CLOSING THE GAP?: ADMISSIONS & ENROLLMENTS AT THE TEXAS
PUBLIC FLAGSHIPS BEFORE AND AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2 (2003), available at
http://theop.princeton.edu/reports/briefs/wws_brief_closinggap.pdf (“[T]he . . . Texas legislature passed
H.B. 588, which guarantees admission to any Texas public college or university for all seniors
graduating in the top 10 percent of their class.”).
26. I am using the term “matter” in the sense that race and ethnicity still figure prominently in the
treatment of individuals and in the distribution of social goods in American and French society. The
ethno-racial discrimination that has historically played a role in both countries continues to substantially
impact the economic and social progress of certain sectors of the French and U.S. populations.
27. Rather than offering some quantifiable number to define “critical mass,” I defer to a definition
given by Erica Munzel, Director of Admissions at the University of Michigan Law School, in
connection with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. According to Munzel, “critical mass” does not correspond to
any particular number but rather refers to a “meaningful representation” of a group that “encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.” Id.
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council, the Conseil constitutionnel, 28 the Preamble and Article 1 of the 1958
Constitution of the French Fifth Republic, 29 the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of
Man, 30 and the Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution of the Fourth Republic. 31
In Sections II and IV, I primarily focus upon the United States and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 32 Section
601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 33 Section 1981(a) of 42 U.S.C.
1981, 34 and the cases Brown v. Board of Education, 35 Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 36 Grutter v. Bollinger, 37 Gratz v. Bollinger, 38 Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin, 39 and Hopwood v. Texas 40 for my analysis. 41
After examining the American and French strategies of ethno-racial inclusion
in terms of their historical, social, political, and legal contexts, in Sections V and
VI, I offer some thoughts on how the two programs compare overall, the positives
and shortcomings of each, and the lessons that Sciences Po’s plan has for the
United States and Texas’ plan has for France. I conclude, in Section VII, that while
proxy strategies can be useful from the perspective of the goals of ethno-racial
diversity and of improving access to equal educational opportunities for minorities,
they alone are likely to prove insufficient to fully meet these goals because of the
particular histories of the two countries, persistent socio-economic barriers and
disparities, and the state of ethno-racial relations in each. Further, I maintain that in
order for academic institutions to be successful in their endeavors to be inclusive
and serve historically underrepresented minorities and increasingly varied multiracial and ethnic populations, along with majority populations: (1) ethnicity and

28. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2001-450DC, July 11, 2001,
Rec. 82 (Fr.), translated in MARTIN A. ROGOFF, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 335-36 (2011) [hereinafter Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC].
29. 1958 CONST. art. 1, pmbl. (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constitution_anglais.pdf.
30. THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN AND CIVIC RIGHTS OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.), available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf [hereinafter
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.)].
31. 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst3.pdf.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. The Civil Rights Act 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-7 (2006).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
37. 539 U.S. 306.
38. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
39. 631 F.3d 213.
40. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996), abrogated by Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
41. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 is also part of the corpus
of equality of education jurisprudence. In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts drew a sharp
distinction between the policy in Grutter, which upheld the use of ethno-racial factors in post-secondary
admissions decisions, and the use of such criteria by primary and high schools. 551 U.S 701, 725 (2007)
(plurality opinion). Since this decision concerns race-conscious plans implemented at the elementary
and secondary school levels and was not used as a reference point for reworking the admissions
procedures I discuss in this article, I have opted not to include it in my analysis.
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race will need to be taken into account and laws must be maintained or fashioned to
address this necessity; and (2) the architects and proponents of proxy strategies
must adhere to transparency in the outcomes so that, if the intended goals are not
being attained, there is a credible basis for making adjustments to the schemes, as
necessary.
I. THE INESCAPABLE PAST AND ITS INFLUENCE ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
POLICIES: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNO-RACIAL INCLUSION
History largely explains why certain ethno-racial minority groups are
identified as the focus of admissions policies designed to increase their
representative numbers in French and American schools. 42 For France, the colonial
history in Africa and treatment of African immigrants once they arrived in the
metropole must be remembered. For the Unites States, the history of African
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, Jim Crow laws, years of de jure
segregation, and ongoing de facto segregation must be kept in mind when
formulating and evaluating student admission policies in higher education.
France, in 2001, and the United States, beginning in the 1950s, implemented
educational programs and policies aimed at addressing inequalities in educational
opportunities in their respective countries. This section and Section II, respectively,
are intended to shed light on the controversial decisions to structure Sciences Po’s
CEP program and the Texas Ten Percent Plan in the manner in which they are
designed.
A. France is Burning: France’s Colonial and Immigration History
The current state of France, with its frequent eruptions of civil protests in
Clichy-sous-Bois, Stains, Grigny, and other Parisian suburbs giving voice to the
outcries regarding the lack of opportunities in education and employment for the
French African population, 43 is deeply rooted in France’s colonial history and its
troubled twentieth century immigration policies. Even though it is generally not
acknowledged in mainstream French discourse, the act of distinguishing between

42. While a historical perspective is relevant, it does not provide the only rationale for using
strategies designed to increase minority representation and opportunities for underrepresented minorities
at elite academic institutions. There are overall benefits that society can reap, as observed in Grutter,
from ensuring that diverse student bodies are achieved at universities and colleges. 539 U.S. at 329.
Nonetheless, history offers some clues to explain why certain ethnic and racial minorities are
underrepresented and, therefore, are the target of a university’s race-proxy or race-conscious admissions
policies. Adopting these approaches can be viewed as equalizing measures. From a historical
perspective, in general, Caucasians had opportunities to attend schools that were not available to
minorities falling within the underrepresented groups. So, a policy fashioned to change the pattern and
impact of historical practices is needed.
43. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Craig S. Smith, French Officials Try to Ease Fear as Crisis Swells,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/international/europe/08france.html
(discussing civil protests in 2005 in which youths burned and destroyed property, confronted police, and
caused disruption primarily in the areas in which they live).
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people on the basis of ethno-racial differences has played a significant role in the
historical formation of France, first as an empire, and later as a leading nation-state
within Europe. 44 While French law, beginning with the Constitution of 1946
purports to ensure human rights and equality for all French citizens, 45 France’s
historical relationship with non-white populations – in the Caribbean, 46 Africa, and
Southeast Asia – along with ethno-racial tensions that were enflamed during the
struggles for independence, 47, and the antisemitic Vichy period, 48 suggest that
strong cultural ideas about ethno-racial differences are embedded in the
consciousness of the contemporary French nation regardless of whether these ideas
are apparent when examining the country’s formal laws. 49
The 1950s, the period immediately preceding the end to France’s colonial
reign in Southeast Asia and Africa, were marked by a substantial influx of
immigrants into France primarily from the Maghreb 50 and West Africa (for
44. Guillaume Aubert, “The Blood of France”: Race and Purity of Blood in the French Atlantic
World, 61 WM. & MARY Q. 439, 443 (2004) (“The idea that natural qualities were transmitted through
blood from one generation to the next . . . rapidly became an essential feature of the early modern
French ethos . . . . [I]nfluential French authors [of this time] repeatedly insisted on the inherent
inequality of mankind.”).
45. See, e.g., 1946 CONST. § 1 (Fr.) (creating the foundation for French equality by stating that
“each human being, without distinction of race, religion or creed, possesses sacred and inalienable
rights” (emphasis added)); JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 199-206 (1992) [hereinafter
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (explaining that equality became the most important issue for
French law after the revolution in 1789, and describing the constitutional, statutory, and court-made
laws which enabled France to move forward into equality after its racially divided past).
46. See WILLIAM B. COHEN, THE FRENCH ENCOUNTER WITH AFRICANS: WHITE RESPONSE TO
BLACKS, 1530-1880, at 35-39, 130-54 (1980) (recounting how France instituted colonies in Martinique,
Haiti, and Guadeloupe in the 1600s that were supported by slave labor).
47. MARTIN SHIPWAY, THE ROAD TO WAR: FRANCE AND VIETNAM 1944-1947 276-78 (Jolyon
Howorth ed., 1996) (describing France’s eight year war with Vietnam).
48. MICHAEL R. MARRUS & ROBERT O. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 181-91 (1981)
(discussing how anti-semitism reached its peak in France from 1941 to 1942).
49. Numerous French scholars have commented on ethnic and race-based prejudice experienced by
peoples of African heritage in France and during the colonial period. See, e.g., Thomas Deltombe &
Mathieu Rigouste, L’Ennemi Intérieur: La Construction Médiatique de la Figure de l’ “Arabe”, in LA
FRACTURE COLONIALE: LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE AU PRISME DE L’HÉRITAGE COLONIAL 191, 191-98
(Pascal Blanchard et al. eds., 2005) (Fr.) (describing the media’s role in perpetuating the French view of
“Arabs” as immigrants and outsiders); COHEN, supra note 46, at 283-93 (describing ideas of race
inferiority developed during France’s colonial history and how they remain present in modern French
society); TAHAR BEN JELLOUN, FRENCH HOSPITALITY: RACISM AND NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS 4751 (Barbara Bray trans., 1999) (noting numerous murders of African Immigrants in France in the year
1982-83); PATRICK MANNING, FRANCOPHONE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1880-1995 26-29 (2d. ed. 1998)
(describing the institution of slavery in French colonies in Africa); Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with
Louis-Georges Tin, Vice President, Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN), FRENCHAM. FOUND. (Jan. 27, 2010), http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/tintranscript_en.pdf
(“Blacks in France are the victims of discrimination—that is a fact. We aren’t discriminated against
because we embody one aspect of ‘diversity;’ we are discriminated against because we are black, and
perceived as such. In order to tackle racial discrimination, we first need to use the appropriate
language.”).
50. HARGREAVES, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 20 (defining the Maghreb as “the
western part of North Africa, consisting of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia” and identifying this region as
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example, Senegal and Mali), and to a lesser extent from Vietnam. 51 Initially, France
encouraged immigration from these areas because of the nation’s shortage of
crucially needed laborers to work in its factories. 52 Males from these regions were
heavily recruited. 53 Over time, with pressure from the workers and other advocates
of immigrants’ rights, African workers were able to bring their families to join
them in France. 54 Despite the initial welcoming gestures, France had no intention of
making these individuals permanent residents of France. As the need for immigrant
labor decreased, the French government devised policies in the 1970s and into the
1980s regarding African immigrants intended to motivate African workers and
their families to return to their originating countries. 55 Rather than return to their
countries of origin, however, many African immigrants became more entrenched in
French culture, in part due to their children who were born on French soil and who
eventually matriculated into the French school system. 56 This community of
African immigrants and their children tended to settle in regions situated in the
the source of the fastest growing group of immigrants to France in the period 1946-82).
51. Id. (identifying Southeast Asians, Turks, and Africans from former French colonies in West and
Central Africa as major immigrant groups into France beginning in the mid-1970s).
52. See Marie-Eve Blanc, Vietnamese in France, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS: IMMIGRANT
AND REFUGEE CULTURES AROUND THE WORLD, 1158, 1159-60 (Melvin Ember et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Blanc, Vietnamese in France] (noting that migration to France occurred in six waves). “The
first wave corresponds to the recruitment of soldiers-workers during Word War I. The French Ministry
of War decided to transplant [immigrants] . . . and employ them in factories and the war industry to
replace workers mobilized for combat.” Id. at 1159. See also James F. Hollifield, Immigration Policy in
France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes, 485 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 113, 116
(1986) (“[T]he rationale for recruiting immigrant workers after 1945 was not only to provide additional
manpower for economic reconstruction and expansion, but also to give a needed boost to the
population.”).
53. See Blanc, Vietnamese in France, supra note 52, at 1160 (“The second wave [of immigration]
occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. . . . This volunteer . . . migration was constituted mostly of
men.”); James R. McDonald, Labor Immigration in France, 1946-1965, 59 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 116, 125 (1969) (“[A] poor harvest in Algeria or a slight expansion of employment
opportunities in France has been sufficient to provoke a wave of labor migration. . . . [T]hese [Algerian]
entrants are mainly coming only on speculation that jobs will be found . . . there are no . . . job contracts
to provide guaranteed employment for a [sic] least a certain percentage of them, and . . . family
immigration is slight . . . .”).
54. See Hargreaves, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 23-24 (providing data showing
females as an increased presence in various immigrant groups in France in the period 1946-99).
55. E.g., Hargreaves, Half-Measures, supra note 12, at 228 (“The presidency of Giscard d’Estaing
was marked from its inception in 1974 to its last gasp in 1981 by a series of initiatives designed to halt
and if possible reverse inward flows of migrants. . . . [T]he administration focused its efforts on . . .
immigrants . . . originating in France’s North African colonies.”); PATRICK WEIL, LA FRANCE ET SES
ÉTRANGERS: L’AVENTURE D’UNE POLITQUE DE L’IMMIGRATION 1938-1991, at 107-38 (1991) (Fr.)
(explaining France’s reverse immigration policies in the 1970s, including one introduced before
Parliament in 1977 by Prime Minister Raymond Barre in which the government would give unemployed
immigrants 10,000 francs if they returned to their country of origin).
56. See Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Dominique Sopo, President, SOS Racisme, FRENCH-AM.
FOUND., 5 (Jan. 28, 2010), http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/sopotranscript_en.pdf
[hereinafter Interview with Dominique Sopo] (“[A]round the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the
1980s, those immigrants [from North and Sub-Saharan Africa] began realizing that, because of their
children, they were likely going to remain in France.”).
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Parisian suburbs; they were connected to, but remained apart from, the Parisian
center. 57 This separation persists today and is relied upon, for better and worse, by
Sciences Po in administering its equality admissions program. 58
The number of people of Arab and African ancestry living in France has been
estimated to be 10% of France’s population, 59 comprising three to six million 60 of
the total population of approximately 63.7 million living in metropolitan France. 61
Even though this minority population is substantial, the indicators for socioeconomic progress show that this group is not faring well relative to the majority

57. See Maurice Blanc, Urban Housing Segregation of North African “Immigrants” in France, in
URBAN HOUSING SEGREGATION OF MINORITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 145,
148 (Elizabeth D. Huttman et al. eds., 1991) (“In Paris, 110,000 North Africans represent one-third of
the foreigners in the city. Most are concentrated in old housing in formerly industrial and working-class
districts of the north and east of the city. In the industrial suburbs close to Paris . . . and more clearly in
industrial suburbs far from Paris . . . they concentrate in large public housing estates.”).
58. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21 (“[France] is increasingly segregated. The
rich cluster together, and the poor are forced to cluster together because there’s no place for them in the
rich areas. Given the fact that a large fraction of young people whose parents, or grandparents, or greatgrandparents immigrated to France, come from less well-off backgrounds, the social, economic, and
cultural segregation I’ve been talking about also turns out to be an ethnic segregation to some degree. As
a result, considering the location of a [high] school allows us to draw upon a much more diverse pool of
potential candidates.”).
59. See, e.g., Colchester, supra note 6 (“An estimated 10% of France’s population has African or
Arab roots.”).
60. Because the French government prohibits statistical data of this kind, Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier
modifiée relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Modified Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978
of Computer Science, Files, and Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.cnil.fr/en-savoir-plus/textesfondateurs/loi78-17/, the estimates of the African population vary widely. See, e.g., Gerda Bikales,
African Migration and the Transformation of France: Interview with Jean-Paul Gourévitch, 14 SOCIAL
CONTRACT 91 (2004), http://www.thesocialcontract.com/pdf/fourteen-two/xiv-2-91.pdf (“[W]e can
reasonably estimate that there are between 2.3 and 3 million Black Africans (including children) in
France today, nearly as many as there are North Africans, who number a little more than 3 million.”);
see also Être né en France d’un parent immigré [Born in France to An Immigrant Parent], INSTITUT
NATIONAL DE
LA
STATISTIQUE
ET
DES
ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES,
available
at
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ip1287 (“[M]ore than half of children
younger than 30 have a relative who came from Africa. . . . 1.3 million descendants between 18 to 50
have at least a father or mother from Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia, or Sub-Saharan Africa. . . . Among
descendants aged 18-20, 18% have a parent from Asia, the Middle East, and America.” (emphasis
added)); France Métropolitaine: Les Immigrés par Sexe, Age, et Pays de Naissance [Urban France:
Immigrants by Sex, Age, and Country of Birth], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES
ÉCONOMIQUES,
http://www.recensement2009.insee.fr/tableauxDetailles.action?zoneSearchField=FRANCE&codeZone=MMETRODOM&idTheme=9&idTableauDetaille=25&niveauDetail=1 (showing that in 2009, the most
recent year for which census data is available, 721,274 immigrants living in metropolitan France were
from Algeria; 663,502 were from Morocco; 236,242 were from Tunisia; 681,892 were from other
African countries; and 734,637 were from other non-European and non-African countries).
61. Demography – Population at the Beginning of the Month – Metropolitant France, INSTITUT
NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES, http://www.insee.fr/en/bases-dedonnees/bsweb/serie.asp?idbank=000436387 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (reporting France’s population
as 63,696,000 in October, 2012).

108

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

white French population. 62 Recent statistics suggest that France’s African French
population, generally does not have the same educational opportunities that are
afforded the majority white French population. According to one article:
Deep fractures have emerged in the French education system. . . .
Schools in many poor neighborhoods are dangerous and run-down.
Some 36% of high school dropouts are children of immigrants, and
those who graduate often lack the skills to find good jobs or enter
higher education. “It is becoming more and more evident that there is
inequality between the schools in suburbs and those in the [more
affluent] city centers.” . . . Wealthier French communities get a
disproportionate share of education aid because their elected officials
have more clout than those from immigrant neighborhoods. 63

France also has an extended colonial history with the Vietnamese that carries
over into the present day. 64 When compared to the African French, Vietnamese
62. See Carol Matlack et al., Crisis in France, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-11-20/crisis-in-france (“Unemployment [in France] is
nearly 10%, and among those under 25 it is nearly 22%, about twice the U.S. rate. Youth joblessness
runs over 50% in the suburbs that are home to many of France’s more than 5 million first- and secondgeneration African and Arab immigrants.”). It is difficult to draw conclusions about the socio-economic
state of the African diaspora in France because French law prohibits the formal collection of statistics on
racial and ethnic groups, Modified Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978 of Computer Science, Files, and
Liberties.
I find the approach taken by CRAN, an advocacy group for black people modeled on the United
States’ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) to be a useful one for
providing some statistical information on how peoples of African heritage are faring economically and
politically in France. CRAN was created in 2005 and is composed of 120 organizations representing
African and Caribbean peoples living in France. Qu’est-ce que le CRAN?, LE CRAN,
http://lecran.org/?p=2037 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). CRAN has emphasized the importance of statistics
on the diversity of France by commenting that they “are the only means of measuring indirect
discrimination, which makes up the most egregious and serious discriminatory acts, in particular
concerning salary gaps and inequalities in career advancement that are what we call the ‘glass ceiling.’”
Carine Fouteau, Des Statistiques Éthniques, Pour Quoi Faire?, DÉSIRS D’AVENIRS PARIS 5 (Mar. 29,
2009), http://desirsdavenirparis5.over-blog.com/article-29628752.html (Fr.) (trans. Kristen Barnes)
(“[L]es statistiques de la diversité «sont le seul instrument de mesure possible des discriminations
indirectes, qui constituent les discriminations les plus criantes et les plus graves, en particulier pour ce
qui concerne les écarts salariaux et les inégalités dans les évolutions de carrière qui sont ce que l’on
appelle le ‘plafond de verre’».”).
CRAN has presented statistics regarding the black French population noting that even though
there are three to five million black people living in France when one examines the situation in 2009: 1)
out of thirty-nine senior ministers there are zero black people serving in this capacity, 2) out of the 324
senators elected in continental France there are zero black people serving in this capacity, 3) looking at
the one hundred top executives in the country there are zero black people. Patrick Lozès, President,
CRAN, Presentation at Constructing Black France, “A Transatlantic Dialogue”: International
Symposium (Apr. 17, 2009).
63. Matlack et al., supra note 62 (quoting Saïd Hanchane, Researcher, Laboratory of Sociology and
Labor Economics, Université de la Méditerranée).
64. See Louis-Jacques Dorais, Vietnamese Communities in Canada, France and Denmark, 11 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 107, 113 (1998) (“As Indochina’s former colonial power, France was always a magnet
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people residing in France make up a relatively small portion of the overall
population. 65 As measured in 2006, the number of Vietnamese immigrants who are
citizens of France constituted approximately 250,000 of a total French population
of sixty million. 66 Overall, there appears to be an appreciable difference in how the
Vietnamese are viewed as compared to the African French. There is also a notable
difference in their economic success. In general, the Vietnamese are considered to
be an assimilated, well-integrated group; the second-generation often identifies
more strongly as French than as Vietnamese. 67 Nonetheless, there are recent
immigrant groups from Vietnam and Cambodia who do suffer from socioeconomic disadvantages similar to those suffered by African immigrants and their
descendants. This sector of the group tends to relocate to the same economicallychallenged suburban zones populated by the marginalized African French
population. 68
The disparities between the wealth and status of the African French population
relative to the majority white French population have highlighted the need to
develop national policies, programs, and laws that can positively impact and
improve the socio-economic situation of this group and other ethno-racial
minorities who lag behind the majority. A landmark response to the status quo
came not from the French Government but from one of the country’s grandes
écoles, Sciences Po.
B. The Design and Implementation of Sciences Po’s Proxy Program
At the outset some explanation of what I mean by a proxy strategy, as applied
in the education policy context, is necessary. A proxy approach typically operates
in the following manner: rather than expressly including race or ethnicity in the
criteria which serve as components of an admissions decision-making process for
an academic institution, a school references alternative criteria (for example, class,
geographic location, high school rank) as substitutes to capture the target
population. 69 Both Sciences Po and Texas have embraced proxy strategies out of

for Vietnamese immigration.”).
65. Répartition des Étrangers par Nationalité, INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES
ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=etrangersnat (last
visited Nov. 4, 2012) (reporting that in 2009, the last year for which census data is available,
approximately 41,000 Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese immigrants resided in France, comprising
1.1% of France’s total immigrant population; approximately 1,534,000 African immigrants resided in
France in 2009, comprising 40.7% of France’s total immigrant population).
66. Blanc, Vietnamese in France, supra note 52, at 1162 (“Today, almost all scholars and official
figures estimate the Vietnamese communities in France to number about 200,000 to 250,000 people.”).
67. See id. (finding that the second and third generations of Vietnamese migrants in France know
little about their country of origin, do not speak Vietnamese, and live like French people).
68. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21 (explaining that Sciences Po’s geographic
affirmative action program will admit Asian immigrants who live within the targeted zones). While
referring to the cultural segregation in France, Descoings notes that “[t]he rich cluster together, and the
poor are forced to cluster together because there’s no place for them in the rich areas.” Id.
69. See, e.g., Elise Langan, The Normative Effects of Higher Education Policy in France, 53 INT’L
J. EDUC. RES. 32, 35 (2012) (“Critics of Sciences Po’s separate admissions policies point out that
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necessity in view of their challenging political and legal environments.
In 2001, Sciences Po took up the challenge to address educational disparities
in France, which often play out along racial and ethnic lines. The school boldly
launched an innovative and radical admissions scheme, which may be described as
France’s first affirmative action program. 70 Then director of Sciences Po, Richard
Descoings, was a chief designer of the plan, known as the Priority Education
Agreements or CEP. 71 The Sciences Po administrators were responding not only to
the lack of ethno-racial diversity in the university’s entering classes but also to the
results of a survey, which indicated that in 2001, “less than 1[%] of the students”
enrolled at Sciences Po were from “working-class backgrounds—as opposed to
12.5[%] . . . enrolled at other non-selective universities.” 72 With the goal of
reversing these trends in mind, the school administrators began devising a program
that would not only help to socially and economically diversify Sciences Po’s
student population but that would also achieve a measure of ethno-racial
diversity. 73
In pursuing these ends, the Sciences Po faced an immediate substantial hurdle
in that the French Constitution does not allow ethno-racial distinctions to be
made. 74 Therefore, any program designed to include the African French population
could not be framed in terms of ethno-racial categories. In this respect, the strategy
adopted would need to look different from affirmative action programs in the
United States that typically make explicit reference to the target populations (e.g.
African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans and, sometimes, Asians) that are
intended to benefit from them. 75 The solution that the French school officials
arrived at was to frame their admissions program in terms of class and geographic
choosing students from poor neighborhoods is a proxy for choosing them based on race and ethnicity.”).
70. See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, 20 FRENCH POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 52,
53 (2002) [hereinafter Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po] (“[D]irector of Sciences Po, Richard
Descoings, by way of experiment, decided to create a special admission track for the students of seven
high schools located in economically disadvantaged areas (‘zones d’éducation prioritaire,’ or ZEP), with
a view to ‘diversifying and democratizing’ the school’s admission process.”). See generally Sabbagh,
Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4 (discussing affirmative action for
college admissions in France and the United States). The name of the program is often abbreviated to
“CEP” and its participants as “CEP” or “ZEP students.” At times, in this paper I also will rely on these
abbreviations to reference the student participants and the program.
PO
ADMISSIONS,
71. Procédure
Conventions
Education
Prioritaire,
SCIENCES
http://admissions.sciences-po.fr/college-cep (Fr.). See generally Priority Education Agreements
Brochure, supra note 17, at 1-3 (describing the Priority Education Agreements, known in French as the
Conventions Education Prioritaire).
72. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 6.
73. Langan, supra note 69, at 35 (“The (former) director of the CEP program, Cyril Delhay, argues
that the initiative is a way to promote diversity.”).
74. See 1958 CONST. I (Fr.) (“France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It
shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It
shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis.”).
75. See, e.g., Tara J. Yosso et al., From Jim Crow to Affirmative Action and Back Again: A Critical
Race Discussion of Racialized Rationales and Access to Higher Education, 28 REV. RES. EDUC. 1, 8
(2004) (“[U.S. college] [a]dmissions officers . . . consider race and gender as ‘plus’ factors in deciding
between multiple highly qualified candidates.”).
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criteria and goals. In other words, the CEP plan would rely upon residential
location and class as proxies for ethnicity and race. 76 Fashioning policies in terms
of these alternative characteristics, as I discuss in more detail in Section III, is not
inconsistent with the French Constitution. Thus, by structuring its program in terms
that address geographic diversity or class disparity issues, the CEP plan has the
effect of being an ethno-racial affirmative action policy without explicitly being
labeled as such. Sciences Po professor Daniel Sabbagh, in describing Sciences Po’s
strategy, concludes:
Therefore, the Sciences Po program, although it officially embodies
an area-based and class-based approach of affirmative action, may
also be understood as indirectly and implicitly targeting groups that,
in the American context, would be considered as ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’
minorities, in particular the group of second-generation North
African immigrants. It may seem at least plausible to read this
formally color-blind policy as partaking of a “hidden agenda”
specifically directed at accelerating the integration of these secondgeneration immigrants into the mainstream through a “substitution
strategy.” 77

The decision to implement this type of program at Sciences Po, an exclusive
and revered institution, which has educated several French presidents and
prominent governing officials, and continues to produce high-ranking corporate
executives, was not universally welcomed. 78 In addition to constitutional challenges
and outcries that the program is an affront to France’s meritocracy, there have been
criticisms that the program conjures up images of the period of colonialism during
which a few “good ones” (namely Arabs and Muslims) of the colonized population
were allowed to intermingle with the white French in Algeria but otherwise, “kept
in their place.” 79

76. See Langan, supra note 69, at 35 (“[C]hoosing students from poor neighborhoods is a proxy for
choosing them based on race and ethnicity.”).
77. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 7 (emphasis
added).
78. Daley, supra note 20.
79. Id. (“‘What hypocrisy,’ wrote Zaïr Kedadouche, adding that the program was reminiscent of the
colonial days in Algeria when most Muslims were kept in their place, but for a few ‘good ones’ who
were allowed to mingle with the French.”); Zaïr Kedadouche, Sciences-Politiquement Correct,
LIBÉRATION (Fr.) (Mar. 8, 2001), http://www.liberation.fr/tribune/0101366413-sciences-politiquementcorrect. This view also relates to the concerns expressed by French legal scholar Gwénaële Calvès that
quotas operate as a ceiling that hinders the access of minority groups to the particular benefit being
sought. Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Gwénaële Calvès, Prof. of Law at the Univ. of CergyFOUND.
(Jan.
28,
2010),
Pontoise,
FRENCH-AM.
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/calvestranscript_en.pdf [hereinafter Interview with
Gwénaële Calvès]. Some critics note that because all the economically disadvantaged neighborhoods are
not included, those schools that have students living within a privileged zone have an advantage over
students who are economically similarly situated but not attending the selected partnership schools. This
criticism may be sufficiently countered in time as more partnership schools are added to the Sciences
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Sciences Po structured its program by linking its admissions procedure to
previously delineated priority education zones, called zones d’éducation prioritaire
or “ZEPs.” 80 Relying upon newly-devised criteria, which I discuss in the following
sections, the university then selects students from the zones for admission.
1.

The Targeted Zones

Sciences Po targets regions for its program based on Paris’ map for dissecting
the city into priority education zones. 81 The specific zones concentrated on by the
university were the sites of many of the high-rise housing estates in which
immigrants and second and third generation French citizens of African extraction
reside. 82 While Sciences Po’s equality admissions program primarily impacts
students of African heritage, it is important to recognize that the measure is
intended to target all economically disadvantaged students living within certain
designated geographic zones. 83 Thus, Vietnamese and Cambodian immigrants who
populate the zones are also included in the eligible pool of candidates. 84 Also, to the
extent that Caucasians of varying ethnicities and recent immigrants are residents of
the target zones and otherwise meet the criteria, they too are eligible to participate
in the program. 85 Descoings, remarks:
Schools in less well-off neighborhoods are made up of whoever
happens to live in the area—whites, Arabs, and blacks, but also
immigrants from Vietnam and Cambodia (we always tend to forget
Asian immigrants in this country)—, and all of these students can

Po’s CEP program. Id.
80. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 53.
81. Id. (describing how Sciences Po’s alternative admissions track targets Priority Education
Zones); see Robert C. Lieberman, A Tale of Two Countries, in RACE IN FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 189, 193 (describing France’s
Priority Education Zones as “a program of targeted assistance to schools in depressed areas” ).
82. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 7070, at 53 (noting that a substantial
portion of the ZEP residents are of “North African extraction”); see also Anna Muldrine, After the
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Nov.
13,
2005),
Flames,
U.S.
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051121/21lede.htm (“When French Interior Minister
Nicolas Sarkozy visited one of the crime-infested high-rise housing projects outside Paris to see how the
government’s measures against violence were working out, the answer was apparent: not so well. He
was pelted with bottles and rocks by the poverty-ridden neighborhood’s residents, made up mainly of
the French-born children and grandchildren of North African immigrants.”).
83. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 3 (“[C]onsidering the location of a
school allows us to draw upon a much more diverse pool of potential candidates”).
84. Id.
85. Cf. id. at 4 (“Every now and then, [a comparatively rich parent living in a ZEP] will enroll
his/her children in the local public high school. Would it be morally acceptable if, when these children
apply to Sciences Po, we inflicted a disadvantage upon them because of their parents’ decision to enroll
them in a school where they were less unfortunate, less poor, and less socially vulnerable than the rest of
the student body? It wouldn’t, and it would only reinforce the tendency for such parents to avoid those
schools in the first place.”).
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equally take advantage of this new, competitive admission track. 86

Selecting its zones based upon the local government’s existing map was a
clever political and legal strategy that has tremendous benefits because it functions
to: (i) legitimize Sciences Po’s program in that there is already the government’s
recognition of the CEP area as one that is in need of socio-economic assistance 87
and (ii) facilitate the achievement of the tacit goal of the CEP program, which is to
accomplish ethno-racial diversity at Sciences Po along with class and geographic
diversity. 88 Scholar Gwénaële Calvès comments on the priority educational areas as
follows:
[T]he creation of “priority educational areas” (zones d’éducation
prioritaire, or ZEPs), according to an administrative guideline
(circulaire) of 1 July 1981, should “contribute to the correction of
inequalities through a selective reinforcement of educational action.”
A 1989 law stated further that the goals of the ZEP are to provide
“special pedagogical attention” to “socially disadvantaged pupils”
through the allocation of additional resources. These resources were
to be directed primarily toward increasing the number of teachers in
these areas—offering them employment incentives as well as a
“specific training.” “To give more to those who have less” is the
general motto of this class-based affirmative action policy. 89

By adopting and incorporating the city’s map into its program, Sciences Po is
able to work with the government to bring about societal changes by servicing
areas of the population that are in dire need of attention with the government’s
86. Id. at 3.
87. See Roland Bénabou et al., Zones D’Éducation Prioritaire: Quels Moyens Pour Quels
Résultats? Une Évaluation sur la Période 1982-1992 [Priority Education Zones: Which Means for
Which Ends?], 380 ÉCONOMIE & STATISTIQUE 3, 3 (2004) (Fr.) (“In 1982, in response to the persistence
of disadvantaged students failing in school, a new tactic seeking equality of treatment was developed:
priority education zones were created in a few regions. The zones were reinforced and extended in 1989
and again in 1990, and have been steadily continued since. These zones incite schools to develop
educational projects and local partnerships by giving them extra resources (credits, jobs, teaching hours,
etc.). The objective is to improve school performance by stimulating new projects. Lowering class sizes
is also considered a tool.”) (trans. Kristen Barnes) (“En 1982, face à la persistance de l’échec scolaire
parmi les élèves les plus défavorisés, une expérience rompant avec l’idée d’égalité de traitement est
tentée : les zones d’éducation prioritaire (ZEP) sont créées dans quelques régions, mesure renforcée et
étendue en 1989, puis en 1990, et prorogée régulièrement depuis. Elle incite les établissements à
développer des projets éducatifs et des partenariats locaux en les dotant de ressources supplémentaires
(crédits, postes, heures d’enseignement, etc.). L’objectif est d’améliorer les résultats scolaires en
stimulant des projets nouveaux. La baisse de la taille des classes est peu à peu considérée également
comme un outil.”).
88. See Langan, supra note 69, at 35 (“The (former) director of the CEP program, Cyril Delhay,
argues that the initiative is a way to promote diversity.”).
89. Gwénaële Calvès, Color-Blindness at a Crossroads in Contemporary France, in RACE IN
FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 219,
221; see also Bénabou et al., supra note 87, at 3 (describing the ZEP’s enactment and goals).

114

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

imprimatur of legality 90 that is apparently needed in order for the CEP measure to
be accepted by the majority French population. In order to fully appreciate the
innovative aspects of the program and its effectiveness it is necessary to provide
more detail on how it functions.
2. Requirements for Admission under the CEP Program and How it
Operates
The CEP plan impacts high school students who are applying to colleges and
universities. Sciences Po, as a prestigious and selective publicly-financed
university, requires a sufficiently high score on the competitive placement exams,
known as le concours, to gain entry. 91 With the adoption of the CEP track, Sciences
Po established new admissions procedures that are exclusively applied to the CEP
students. 92 Initially, twenty places for students from designated geographic areas
were created to add to Sciences Po’s total undergraduate student population of
approximately 2,500. 93 Rather than using the traditional entrance exam scores as a
basis for admission, under the policy governing the newly created CEP slots,
Sciences Po considers, as admissions criteria, the recommendations of the high

90. This is not to say that CEP’s legality has not been challenged. See Langan, supra note 69, at 3536 (“In 2001, France’s leading right-wing union, the ‘National Interuniversity Union’ (UNI) asked the
Court Tribunal of Paris to cancel the CEP program, arguing that by creating an admissions track that is
open to certain students based on where they live, the university was violating the constitutional
guarantee of equal opportunity. The French National Assembly and Senate subsequently ruled that the
Board of Directors at Sciences Po could determine its conditions and methods of admission and allowed
it to adopt procedures that assured diverse recruitment. It authorized Sciences Po to experiment and
reaffirmed the institution’s autonomous corporate status irrespective of the fact that it receives
government subsidy. In 2003, an appeals court ruled that the CEP program could continue with some
modifications, e.g., expanding the number of secondary schools from which Sciences Po draws; UNI is
still waging efforts to dismantle the CEP initiative.”).
91. Id. at 34 (“Sciences Po falls into the category of a grande école and was started to train the
French elite for careers in civil service. Grandes écoles are characterized by their competitive entry
examinations, or ‘le concours,’ preparation for which requires two years beyond the baccalauréat and
necessitates studying a specialized curriculum only available in a limited number of selective secondary
schools. Some concours preparatory courses are offered at government expense to the best students.
Private courses cost over $8000. The Sciences Po concours is comprised of four written elements: three
known criteria and a surprise essay question. In addition, there is an extensive oral examination whereby
applicants are not only expected to know the material but to be engaging and witty. One legendary story
is when an applicant was asked how far the distance was if he were to dive off the Pont Neuf into the
Seine. Without missing a beat, he replied that the bridge was slightly arched so the distance would
depend on exactly where he was standing when diving.”).
92. Id. at 35 (“Seeking to alter [the school’s] white, male homogeneity, alumnus Richard Descoings,
the Director of Sciences Po since 1996, admitted 18 ZEP students in the fall of 2001, without requiring
them to sit for the concours. Applying ZEP students are made to write two papers—one a synthesis of
press articles related to a specific topic, the other an essay on the same subject—and defend them before
a jury composed of teachers and administrators from their high school. If selected, they submit to oral
interviews of 30-40 min at Sciences Po before a preliminary round of five judges. Those who pass go
before thirty judges composed of academics, politicians, and business executives and undergo a rigorous
oral examination. Students are evaluated on their maturity, originality, and ability to succeed.”).
93. Daley, supra note 20.
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school teachers at the participating schools, test scores on the national baccalauréat
exam, 94 grades, the student’s overall “profile,” an oral presentation, and an
interview. 95 If selected, the CEP students “are offered financial aid and special
access to tutoring and mentoring upon matriculation to help them adjust to this new
and highly demanding educational environment.” 96
Seventeen students were admitted under the CEP criteria in the first year of
the program. 97 The program has grown beyond its initial numbers, despite ongoing
resistance. 98 In 2002, thirty-two CEP students were admitted. 99 In 2007, 117 CEP
students were admitted. 100 The number of CEP admissions increased again in 2009
to 126 students. 101 The program has also developed in terms of the number of
participating high schools targeted for the special track, expanding from the initial
seven participating high schools in 2001 to eighty-eight in 2011. 102
3. Performance of CEP Students at Sciences Po and the Effectiveness of
the Proxy Strategy in Increasing Diversity and in Improving Access for
Ethno-Racial Minorities in France
A consideration of how the CEP students are performing at Sciences Po and of
the growth of the CEP initiative is important to the assessment of this new
admissions program. 103 Recent information on the CEP plan reveals that while it

94. The baccalauréat is different from the concours. The baccalauréat is administered in two parts.
The first part is given during a high school student’s junior year. The second part of the exam is
administered over a two-week period in June and July of the senior year. Students must receive a
designated minimum score. Depending upon the score one receives, an oral component may also be
imposed as a requirement for passing. See Carolyn W. Schott, The National Competency of Testing, 2
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 97, 102 (1992), for a discussion of the French competency exam.
95. Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21.
96. Melissa LaiFat et al., Shaping Preferential Treatment Policies Without Race: The Case of
Admission to Elite Institutions of Higher Education in France, HUMAN. IN ACTION,
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/121-shaping-preferencial-treatment-policies-withoutrace-the-case-of-admission-to-elite-institutions-of-higher-education-in-france (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
97. Diversity and Accessibility: A University for All Talents, SCIENCES PO.,
http://www.sciencespo.fr/en/content/80/diversity-and-accessibility (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter
Diversity and Accessibility].
98. See Daley, supra note 20 (“Some have applauded the program as a small step toward addressing
a growing disadvantaged population in France, and the often unspoken racial issue it entails. But others
see it as an attack on a tradition that has produced scholars of high quality as well as a slide into an
American-style system.”); Diversity and Accessibility, supra note 97 (noting an increase in the
program’s numbers for student intake).
99. Diversity and Accessibility, supra note 97. In addition, of the thirty-seven students admitted in
2003, “two-thirds [had] at least one foreign-born parent . . . from Algeria or Morocco.” Sasha PolakowSuransky, Crème de la Crème: How a Few Dozen Immigrant Students at an Elite French College
Created a Crise Constitutionnelle and Still Got Good Report Cards, LEGAL AFF. (July/Aug. 2004),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/story_suransky_julaug04.msp.
100. Id.
101. Diversity and Accessibility, supra note 97.
102. Priority Education Agreements Brochure, supra note 17, at 4.
103. In using the term “assessment,” I am not proposing to undertake an extensive empirical study of
the Sciences Po CEP students’ performance on exams, graduation rates, and job placement in
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has had some positive effects on improving the quality of post-secondary
educational opportunities available to the African French population and to
students from lower socio-economic rungs, the overall results are nominal, given
the enormity of the national problem. 104 My comments focus on the areas of (i)
student performance in the program and graduation rates, (ii) the increase in ethnoracial diversity at Sciences Po, (iii) the impact of the CEP plan more broadly in
terms of other post-secondary academic institutions, and (iv) the numbers reported
regarding job placement rate and salaries of students.
There are three main conclusions that I draw from my examination of the
reports regarding the CEP initiative. First, this proxy strategy has not been
expanded enough within the walls of Sciences Po and beyond to have a profound
impact on the opportunities available to underrepresented minorities, such as
African French students, to attend quality institutions of higher education. Second,
the prohibition on ethno-racial classifications makes it impossible to fully and
accurately assess the impact of the CEP plan on the lives of the target population;
thereby, impairing the development of cogent arguments regarding what remains to
be done in terms of designing initiatives for the future. Third, while the ostensible
limitations of the current strategy being used by Sciences Po may not be due to the
fact that it is an approach that relies on other factors (that is, class and geography)
in lieu of ethnicity and race, the constraints that the program is experiencing
suggest that bolder initiatives, such as explicit ethno-race-based policies, are
needed in addition to the CEP track in order to make significant advancement
towards the goal of equal educational opportunity for all in France. Regarding the
last point, Sciences Po imposes limitations on how far to extend the program based
in part on the administration’s political assessment of what the French population
will tolerate in the interest of diversity, and also on what French laws will permit
the school to do. 105 I discuss in greater detail the impact of the legal environment on
Sciences Po’s special admissions program in Section III.
The data available on student performance show that the CEP measure has
been successful in demonstrating that post-secondary institutions can utilize
alternative criteria as a basis for admitting students without suffering a loss in the
quality of the education provided overall and without creating a situation in which
the students selected under different requirements will not perform adequately to
comparison with other Sciences Po students from the inaugural moment of the program in 2001 to the
present. Rather, I primarily rely upon the reports that Sciences Po has issued to draw conclusions about
the program. See Vincent Tiberj, Sciences Po, dix ans après les Conventions Education Prioritaire
[Sciences Po, Ten Years after the Priority Education Agreements], SCIENCES PO (2011),
http://www.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/CEP_Etude_VTiberj_final.pdf (Fr.) (reporting progress on
the CEP program ten years after its initiation); 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po,
SCIENCES PO, http://www.sciencespo.fr/en/content/7686/10-years-promoting-student-diversity (last
visited Oct. 15, 2012) (summarizing the above report’s findings in English).
104. See Hargreaves, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 40-74 (analyzing the relationship
between low socio-economic status and immigrants in France).
105. See Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC, supra note 28, ¶ 31 (upholding Sciences
Po’s admissions policy under the French Constitution; relying in part on its guarantee of equal access to
education for children and adults).
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graduate. 106 According to a new 2011 study, commissioned by Sciences Po and
conducted by French sociologist Vincent Tiberj, approximately 90% of CEP
students graduate within three years of being admitted to Sciences Po. 107 The
statistics help to counter those critics who assert that affirmative action programs
undermine meritocracy. Typically, those asserting that affirmative action plans
such as CEP are not meritocratic argue that exams and grades are neutral and fair
mechanisms for measuring achievement and ability, and that students should be
rewarded based upon how they perform by gaining admission to prestigious
academic institutions. 108 Relevant to my thesis is my corollary argument that the
concept of meritocracy itself needs to be unpacked to explore the extent to which
the criteria used to structure the meritocracy serve to perpetuate ethno-racial and
class stratifications and socio-economic inequities. 109 Where the purported neutral
standard serves as a barrier to entry for certain underrepresented ethno-racial
populations, other criteria (for example, ethnicity and race) must be included in the
evaluation process to counter that effect. 110 The data on the CEP program support
my conclusion that the so-called neutral standards are not the only means for
identifying able and talented candidates who have the potential to succeed
academically and progress to meaningful, lucrative careers if given the
opportunities to do so. 111 The use of the concours exam is not the inevitable

106. See 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103 (concluding that
CEP students “keep up or quickly catch up with their peers, and the[ir] drop-out rate is ‘marginal’”).
107. D.D. Guttenplan, In France, a Bastion of Privilege No More, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/world/europe/05iht-educLede05.html. Older data from 2004 also
shows that the CEP students performed with a “pass rate of 82 percent compared to 90 percent of
students overall for the 2001-2002 academic year.” Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99.
108. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 59 (addressing the criticism
that the CEP program is not meritocratic).
109. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1711, 1721-23 (1995) (analyzing the concept of “merit” and how it preserves the status quo). I agree
with the legal scholar Ronald Dworkin that “[p]laces in selective universities are not merit badges or
prizes for some innate talent or for past performance or industry: they are opportunities that are properly
offered to those who show the most promise of future contribution to goals the university rightfully
seeks to advance.” Ronald Dworkin, The Court and the University, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (May 15,
2003), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2003/may/15/the-court-and-the-university/. “These
goals can be, and historically have been, social as well as more narrowly academic.” Id. The goal of
addressing unequal access to education for underrepresented ethno-racial minorities is one that a
university may appropriately adopt; however, from the United States’ legal standpoint, the compelling
goal will have to be framed in terms of critical mass, defined by the educational benefits of diversity in
order to satisfy constitutional requirements. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he Law School’s concept
of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.
These benefits are substantial.”).
110. See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity:
Challenging the Myth of “Preferential Treatment”, AFR. AM. POL’Y F. (Feb. 25, 2007),
http://aapf.org/2007/02/equalizingopportunity/ (arguing that the beneficiaries of affirmative action are
not less qualified than other candidates but “their capabilities are not accurately gauged or fairly
evaluated by prevailing selection criteria and procedures” (emphasis added)).
111. E.g., Guttenplan, supra note 107 (“On average at least 90 percent of students admitted under the
[CEP] initiative graduate after three years.”).
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instrument that French schools must rely upon to bar and admit students since it is
not the only means, or even necessarily the best way to determine who can succeed
in academic institutions of higher education. 112
From the vantage of whether the Sciences Po’s proxy approach has worked to
increase the ethno-racial diversity of its student population, the data suggest that the
program has made some progress in improving the access of students of African
heritage to this institution. The information available shows that a substantial
number of the 860 CEP students admitted from 2001 to 2011 are persons of
African heritage. 113 The statistics further indicate that “in 2009, 83% of the
beneficiaries of [the CEP program] had at least one foreign-born parent, and 85%
of that 83% had a parent born on the African continent.” 114 It is not clear whether
the numbers referenced are limited exclusively to the year 2009 or whether they
refer to total beneficiaries of the CEP initiative over time from 2001 to 2009. If one
assumes that the foregoing numbers refer to the entering class of 2009, then using
other data available, which indicate that the total entering class size for that year
was 1224 (this number includes the 126 CEP students admitted that year), 115 one
can estimate that of the 126 CEP students, approximately 105 had foreign-born
parents and approximately 89 CEP students of the 126 were of African heritage.
While the data show an improvement in numbers compared to the seeming dearth
of an African presence at the school before the implementation of the CEP track,
the impact is nominal. Eight hundred sixty CEP students, out of approximately
10,000 total students that attended Sciences Po from 2001 to 2011, 116 do not
establish that the goal of equal educational opportunity is being met. Rather, the
limitations of the plan highlight the need for a national mandate that will prompt
112. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 53 (“Instead of having to take
the competitive exam imposed on all other applicants, [CEP applicants] were asked to write two
papers—one a synthesis of several press articles collected on a chosen topic, the other an analytical
essay on that same subject—and defend them before a jury made up of teachers and administrators of
their high school. Then, the best candidates were invited for an interview at Sciences Po itself. Those
who received an admission offer at the end of the day were also provided with financial aid, as well as
with a specific kind of tutoring (available on an optional basis) to help them adjust to their new
educational environment.”); 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103
(summarizing data showing CEP students’ successes at Sciences Po).
113. See, e.g., Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99 (noting that two-thirds of the thirty-seven CEP
students admitted in 2003 had at least one foreign-born parent, and the national origin of the foreignborn parent was primarily “Algeria or Morocco”); Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 3
(noting that a majority of CEP students have a parent born on the African continent).
114. Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 3. Institutions are allowed, under French
law, to ask about the nationality of a student’s parents. Id. From the information, one might draw
conclusions about ethno-racial background, although this approach does not ensure 100% accuracy.
115. See id. (stating that, in 2009, 83% of CEP students had a foreign born parent, and 85% of those
students had an African born parent); 2011 Bilan Chiffré Des Admissions, SCIENCES PO (2012),
http://www.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/ScPo_Bilan_admissions_2011_V2.pdf
(Fr.)
(providing
admissions data for the 2009 undergraduate class).
116. 10 Years of Promoting Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103 (stating that 860 CEP students
have attended Sciences Po since the program started). The total number of attendees is calculated based
on the information that 2,500 undergraduates attend Sciences Po at a time, and the program takes
students three years to complete. Daley, supra note 20.
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other grandes écoles, such as the École Normale Supérieure and the École
Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales (“ESSEC”) business
school to adopt similar diversifying policies. A nationally administered plan would
enable a central institution to hold the schools accountable if there are no
measurable changes in the ethno-racial and socio-economic backgrounds of their
students. 117 The commendable work of expanding educational opportunity and
diversifying student populations should not fall on Sciences Po alone.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the job placement rates and salaries of the
CEP students once they graduate to determine whether meaningful inroads have
been made to change the socio-economic condition of this marginalized
population. 118 It is imperative that the effects of the program not stop at the doors of
Sciences Po but rather operate to improve the economic mobility of this group.
This result is necessary in order for the French nation to achieve the diversification
of the upper echelon work force and for France to live up to its ideal of
egalitarianism. The data show “two-thirds of the students who graduated between
2006 and 2011 are currently employed” and that “[t]he proportion of CEP students
in full-time employment (63%) is higher than that of their Sciences Po peers
(56%).” 119 Further, “[t]wo-thirds of the CEP graduates who find employment in the
private sector are on secure, permanent ‘CDI’ contracts” and “[h]alf of the CEP
students earn more than 2500 euros per month after tax, which is 300 euros more
than the average net salary of Sciences Po graduates from the class of 2009.” 120
Using 860 students as the limit of the program’s reach, the improvement in job

117. See Les programmes Égalité des chances, ESSEC BUS. SCH., http://egalite-deschances.essec.edu/page-fille-1 (Fr.) (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing ESSEC’s tutoring of high
school students and alternate admissions process for socio-economically disadvantaged students,
including a year-long preparatory course before applicants gain admission to the program); Grande
BUS.
SCH.,
http://www.essec.fr/programmes/grandeÉcole
Admission,
ESSEC
ecole/admission/concours.html (Fr.) (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing three different routes to
admission to ESSEC); Socio-Educational Programs, ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE PARIS,
http://www.ens.fr/spip.php?rubrique98&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing ENS’s Talens
program that provides tutoring to high school students in preparation for admission, and also
Perspectives, a program that provides tutoring for high school students in rural areas of France as well as
overseas territories); Admission at the ENS, ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE PARIS,
http://www.ens.fr/spip.php?rubrique26&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing four different
routes to admission to ENS); Aisha Labi, In France, Making Room at the Top of Higher Education,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 19, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/In-France-Making-Room-atthe/124438/ (contrasting the CEP program with other admissions practices and quoting Eric Keslassy, an
expert on diversity, that the CEP program is “poorly perceived” because “any form of positive
discrimination is seen as inconsistent with republican ideals of treating all citizens equally”). While I am
not advocating the adoption of quotas here, I maintain that there has to be a way to collect statistics to
determine whether the policies the schools are implementing to effect the change I have outlined are
succeeding.
118. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 7 (discussing the importance of
attending one of the grandes écoles to achieve the most elite position in a given field).
119. 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103; see also Tiberj, supra
note 103, at 2-5 (summarizing these statistics in a full report in French).
120. 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103; Tiberj, supra note 103,
at 2-5.
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attainment and salaries for a few is a positive start but it falls woefully short of the
kind of change that is needed to show that the French nation is fully embracing this
population.
II. THE SHIFT FROM ETHNO-RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO PROXY
STRATEGIES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Principle of Equal Educational Opportunity in the United States
For my historical treatment of the concept of equal educational opportunity in
the United States and the emergence of the Texas Ten Percent Plan, I am primarily
concerned with the cluster of cases in which ideas about equal access and
opportunity in education began to germinate. Specifically, this discussion traces the
shift away from the goal of ethno-racial inclusion towards broad-based diversity,
and the move towards the use of proxy strategies. There is a substantial body of
historical literature that covers the development of affirmative action policies in the
educational realm beginning with the Civil Rights legislation of the John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson era to the present. 121 It is not my intention to retread
this ground but, rather, to provide enough historical context to analyze the purposes
and goals related to devising the Texas Ten Percent Plan and to assess the plan’s
effectiveness.
1.

The Rise of Affirmative Action in the United States

As an initial matter, it is necessary to provide a definition of affirmative action
as it has developed in the United States. Affirmative action may be defined both as
“a government policy that seeks to remedy long-standing discrimination directed at
specific racial/ethnic minorities and women” 122 and as “an umbrella concept that
subsumes different types of policies and practices tailored to meet specific, contextderived problems of discrimination and unfairness.” 123 The concept has its origins
in an Executive Order that President John F. Kennedy signed on March 6, 1961. 124
Executive Order 10,925 prohibited government contractors from “discriminat[ing]
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or
national origin” and further required “affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin.” 125 President Lyndon Johnson signed
Executive Order 11,246 on September 24, 1965, which superseded Executive Order

121. E.g., EBONI M. ZAMANI-GALLAHER, ET AL., THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON CAMPUS:
CONCEPTS OF EQUITY, CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRACTICE, 1-8 (2009) (discussing the evolution of
diversity and affirmative action policies in U.S. universities).
122. Id. at 2.
123. Lynn W. Huntley, Foreword to ZAMANI-GALLAHER ET AL., supra note 121, at xiv.
124. Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 comp.), superseded by Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 CFR 339 (1965).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
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10,925. 126 Executive Order 11,246 states in relevant part that it is the Federal
Government’s policy to “promote the full realization of equal employment
opportunity through a positive, continuing program in each executive department
and agency.” 127
2.

Equality of Educational Opportunity Historical Legal Precedents

The main historical legal precedents concerning equality of educational
opportunity leading up to the implementation of the Texas Ten Percent Plan
include Sweatt v. Painter, 128 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas
(“Brown I”), 129 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 130 and Hopwood v.
Texas. 131 In many ways, the United States’ initial approach to affirmative action
beginning in the 1960s is captured by the words Justice Blackmun expressed in his
separate opinion in Bakke, “[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently.” 132 At the time of this quote, the “persons”
Blackmun was referencing were primarily African Americans. 133
126. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 CFR 339 (1965), amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684
(1967-1970 comp.).
127. Id. These affirmative policies were extended to females in 1967 through Executive Order
Number 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1967-1970 comp.).
128. 339 U.S. 629, 632-36 (1950). Sweatt v. Painter is an important historic case for at least two
reasons. First, Sweatt dealt with the question of whether the University of Texas’ law school admissions
policy, which in compliance with Texas’ segregation laws prohibited the admission of blacks to its
school, was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 635. The
Sweatt Court held that the separate law school facilities for blacks proposed by the University of Texas
as an alternative to granting Heman Sweatt admission were insufficient to satisfy the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. This 1950 holding set the ground for the subsequent landmark
decision of Brown I, 347 U.S. 483. Second, Justice Powell in Bakke, cited Sweatt as a basis for the
Court’s ruling on diversity noting that “even at the graduate level, our tradition and experience lend
support to the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial.” 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell,
J.). Justice Powell went on to quote the following relevant language from Sweatt:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study
in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of
views with which the law is concerned.
Id. at 314 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634).
129. 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that public school segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
130. 438 U.S. at 271 (holding the University of California at Davis Medical School’s admissions
procedure constitutionally invalid).
131. 78 F.3d at 934 (holding that the University of Texas’ 1992 admissions procedure was in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
132. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). See generally Herbert N. Bernhardt,
Affirmative Action in Employment: Considering Group Interests While Protecting Individual Rights, 23
STETSON L. REV. 11, 20 (1993) (“Blackmun represented the moderated position, which was that
affirmative action was necessary to comply with the law, but that it also carried dangers. Neither
Blackmun nor other moderates in society, however, had formulated or articulated the rules that would
enable affirmative action to achieve its goals while avoiding the dangers.”).
133. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion) (“At least until the early 1970s,
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The Brown I decision, in terms of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, marks
the crystallization of the concept of equality of educational opportunity that moves
beyond the superficial level to a concrete lived equality. 134 Prior to Brown I, public
schools, along with other cultural institutions and businesses, were legally
permitted to exclude individuals on the basis of race from entering their doors and
enjoying their benefits. 135 African Americans suffered the brunt of these
exclusionary practices in the United States. 136 The legally sanctioned segregation of
people on the basis of race that was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson 137 signified unwillingness on the part of American society to fully include
African Americans within the concept of the nation. 138 The roots of current-day
education and socio-economic disparities in the United States can be traced to the
racially discriminatory practices that prevailed in this country over the course of
many years. 139 The Brown I decision was a watershed moment in which the U.S.
Supreme Court made a link between addressing societal ills, racial exclusion, and
educational opportunity. The Brown I Court considered the question: “Does
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the

apparently only a very small number, less than 2%, of the physicians, attorneys, and medical and law
students in the United States were members of what we now refer to as minority groups. In addition,
approximately three-fourths of our Negro physicians were trained at only two medical schools. If ways
are not found to remedy that situation, the country can never achieve its professed goal of a society that
is not race conscious.”); see also Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies: A Summary of
Important Rulings, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/race/summary.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2012) (summarizing the facts in Bakke and stating that the University of California at
Davis Medical School reserved sixteen spaces for “disadvantaged” students who were defined as
“blacks, Latinos, American Indians and Asian-Americans”).
134. There are earlier segregation cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the doctrine of
separate but equal in the education context. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637,
642 (1950) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from treating a graduate student
differently than other students on the basis of race); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
352 (1938) (holding that a state law school could not deny admission based on race when the
comparable school for blacks did not provide equal advantages). The Brown I case is a consolidation of
five cases involving public elementary and high schools covering the states of Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware and was brought by African Americans who were challenging, on the ground of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine in public education.
347 U.S. at 486-89.
135. See Deborah Mayo-Jefferies, Discrimination in the Education Process Based on Race, 21 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 21, 21 (1995) (“A dual education system was established wherein African-American children
attended school with African-American children, and Caucasian children attended school with
Caucasian children.”).
136. See id. (“Under this system, only a fraction of what was spent to educate Caucasian students was
allocated for African-American students.”).
137. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
138. See Douglas J. Ficker, From Roberts to Plessy: Educational Segregation and the “Separate but
Equal” Doctrine, 84 J. NEGRO HIST. 301, 301 (1999) (“The segregation era was a contradictory period
in American legal history [marked by] institutional separation of African-Americans from EuropeanAmericans.”).
139. Id. (detailing state courts’ interpretation and application of the “separate but equal” doctrine
from 1849 to 1954).
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children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?” 140
The answer from the Court was a decisive “Yes.” The Court ruled in favor of
the African American plaintiffs who were denied admission to public schools
attended by white students pursuant to the “separate but equal” doctrine. 141 In so
ruling, the Court held that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal” 142 and that prohibiting African American students from attending certain
public schools based solely upon their race meant that they were “deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 143 With
this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine
upheld in Plessy and embraced the progressive idea that equality of educational
opportunity means more than the enactment of facially neutral laws. 144 This
understanding of equality as involving more than adopting legislation and
implementing policies that are devoid of ethnic or racial language in the name of
treating all citizens on an equal basis is one that should be kept in mind in
formulating admission policies for higher education institutions. The Brown I
Court’s definition of equality of educational opportunity is a broad and expansive
one. 145 Recognizing the fundamental role of education in the formation of
individuals and citizens, the Brown I Court concluded that, “Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.” 146 While the Court has since moved away from the
notion that education is a right, 147 the principle of equality of educational
opportunity articulated in Brown I should be kept in mind when evaluating current
admissions policies in place in Texas and other states.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 148 is the next case in the line
of important legal precedents concerning the ongoing debate over the use of ethnoracial criteria in higher education admissions policies. Justice Powell’s opinion is
often consulted as a resource for determining the constitutionally proper contours
for race-based educational programs. 149 Bakke signaled how the U.S. Supreme
140. 347 U.S. at 493.
141. Id. at 495.
142. Id. In this respect, the Court went further than its ruling in Sweatt.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 493.
146. 347 U.S. at 493.
147. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (stating that education is
not a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221,
230 (1982) (reaffirming that public education is not a constitutional right; holding that Texas could not
deny free public education to school-age illegal immigrant children without showing that it was acting in
furtherance of a substantial state interest); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (holding that a
Texas statute restricting eligibility for tuition-free education was a bona fide residency requirement and
was permitted under the Constitution); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 465 (1988)
(upholding a bus transportation fee imposed by North Dakota under the Constitution because the policy
did not discriminate against any suspect class, interfered with no fundamental right, and served the
legitimate government purpose of school district reorganization).
148. 438 U.S. 265.
149. The Bakke Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the Harvard College Admissions program
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Court would view race-conscious programs designed to increase the educational
opportunities available to historically disadvantaged minorities and to remedy past
discrimination suffered by those minority groups in the educational realm. 150 This
case is particularly significant to my analysis for several reasons: (i) because the
Bakke case was available to both Sciences Po and Texas for the instruction it offers
on the type of affirmative action admissions program that will pass constitutional
muster in the United States and the type of program that will likely give rise to
substantial controversy and prove constitutionally fatal; 151 (ii) because of its
holding that race may be considered as a factor in designing admissions programs,
and that diversity is a compelling, constitutionally permissible interest that can be
pursued by the State in the structuring of its educational programs; 152 and (iii)
because of the deference the Powell Court accords to school officials regarding
their structuring of ethno-race-conscious admissions policies that balance the
interests of the academic institution with those of their applicant pools. 153
In the initial suit, a white male named Allan Bakke, whose previous
applications for admission to the Medical School at the University of California at
Davis (the “Medical School”) were denied, filed a claim against the Medical
School alleging that the school’s special admissions program discriminated against
him on the basis of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
described in the appendix to Justice Powell’s plurality opinion. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-24 (opinion of
Powell, J.). Powell’s opinion evidences the Court’s recognition that certain race-conscious admissions
programs may pass constitutional muster. Id. at 325-26. In addition, his favorable comments on elements
of the Harvard admissions program provide some guidance to all schools on how they can design raceconscious educational policies and programs that are constitutionally valid. Id. at 321-24. According to
that program, no target number was set for the school’s goal of diversifying its students and the notion
of diversity was defined broadly to take into account past academic performance, life experience,
geographic region, musical talent, scientific ability, athletic ability, race, ethnicity, etc. Id. at 322-23.
150. See id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting) (remedying
effects of past societal discrimination is a sufficiently important interest to justify the use of raceconscious admissions programs where minority underrepresentation is substantial because of handicaps
caused by past discrimination).
151. See Daniel Sabbagh, The Rise of Indirect Affirmative Action: Converging Strategies for
Promoting “Diversity” in Selective Institutions of Higher Education in the United States and France, 63
WORLD POL. 470, 483 n.63 (2011) (discussing Science Po and the Supreme Court’s affirmative action
discussion in Bakke); see also David Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas’ Ten Percent Solution:
Improving Diversity and Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 187 (1998) (discussing how Hopwood’s
rejection of the Bakke standard, and the subsequent impact of Hopwood on minority admissions, led to
the Texas legislature’s adoption of the Ten Percent Plan).
152. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20, 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.) (finding that diversity is a
constitutionally valid goal and that, though the program at the Medical School violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, there still may be significant state interests which might be properly served by the
“competitive consideration of race” in an admissions program). Because the Bakke case produced six
separate opinions, there was some question as to whether Justice Powell’s conclusion that diversity
constitutes a legitimate compelling interest was part of the majority holding. Id. at 314-15. This issue
was resolved in Grutter v. Bollinger, where the Court “endors[ed] Justice Powell’s view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”
539 U.S. at 325.
153. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“[A] university must have wide discretion in
making the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted . . . .”).
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Fourteenth Amendment, article I, section 21 of the California Constitution, and
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 154 Specifically, Bakke
complained about a program that the Medical School devised in the 1970s in
response to the limited (or nonexistent) number of African Americans, Latino
Americans, American Indians, and Asian Americans in the entering Medical
School class of one hundred students. 155 The approach the Medical School took
carved out sixteen places of the existing one hundred slots and created a program
that would operate in conjunction with the pre-existing admissions program, giving
special attention to identifying “qualified” economically disadvantaged students
and students who were members of minority groups. 156 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the portion of the lower court’s judgment that held the Medical School’s
special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, but reversed
the portion of the lower court’s decision that held that the Medical School may not
consider race as a factor in deciding upon which applicants to admit. 157
Specifically, the Bakke Court held that “the State has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.” 158 This groundbreaking aspect
of the Bakke decision has been essential to the development of affirmative action
policies in higher education and their treatment in the U.S. legal arena from the
time of the holding to the present-day debates raging over ethnicity, race, and
education. 159
A substantial portion of my analysis of the Texas Ten Percent Plan focuses on
the admissions policy of the University of Texas at Austin (“UT Austin”). Bakke is
relevant to my discussion because the Harvard College Admissions program
favorably commented on by Justice Powell in Bakke, along with the University of
Michigan plan challenged in Grutter, helped shape UT Austin’s admissions
process. 160 The Bakke Court’s holding that school officials may reference ethnicity
and race as factors they may weigh in their admissions decisions and its recognition
of diversity as a compelling interest are relevant to my analysis in several key
respects. First, in making this allowance for ethnicity and race to be considered,

154. Id. at 276-78.
155. Id. at 272-76.
156. See id. at 274-75 (explaining that the minority groups that the program targeted included blacks,
Latinos, Asians, and American Indians).
157. Id. at 320.
158. Id.
159. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity Justification, 29
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1998) (addressing the impact of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke on
institutions of higher learning in developing acceptable affirmative action admissions processes, and the
potential for Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, to have a similar impact); see also Kimberly A. Pacelli,
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Navigating the Narrows Between Grutter and Parents Involved,
63 ME. L. REV. 569, 572-73 (2011) (discussing how Bakke provided guidance as to how universities can
use race in making admissions decisions).
160. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 217-18 (acknowledging that UT Austin’s race-conscious admissions
program was modeled after the program in Grutter and influenced by Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke).
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there is an implicit acknowledgement that both factors operate in daily life in ways
that can influence one’s access to vital resources, the quality of education one
receives, and the employment prospects one has in society. 161 Therefore, in order to
counter the negative de facto discrimination that permeates society, some reliance
on ethno-racial criteria may be necessary to address the disadvantages the majority
may inflict on certain ethno-racial minorities. 162 The Bakke Court does not phrase
its ruling in these terms; in fact, it expressly rejects the purpose of “countering the
effects of societal discrimination” as a compelling state interest justifying the
reliance on ethno-racial classifications. 163 Nonetheless, given the holding, which
recognized diversity as a compelling interest and the allowance of ethno-racial
factors in admissions decisions, Justice Powell’s opinion suggests some tacit
agreement with the aforementioned view. 164 Second, the Bakke holding regarding
ethno-racial criteria functions as a fallback to proxy strategies in the United States
if they fall short of their goal of admitting a meaningful number of
underrepresented ethno-racial minorities to colleges and universities. That is, as I
discuss later in this article, because of Bakke (and the Grutter Court’s reaffirmation
of certain aspects of Bakke), Texas can resort to ethno-racial factors in its
admissions process as its schools deem necessary, even though the State has
enacted a percentage plan. 165 The consequence is that Texas’ post-secondary
schools have not been limited to the indirect strategy of the Ten Percent Plan. 166
Third, with Bakke, there is a thematizing of the concept of diversity, which has
helped and hurt efforts to attain equal educational opportunity for ethno-racial
minorities in the United States. 167 The concept of diversity itself also may be
viewed as a proxy to the extent that it serves as a code for discussing ethnicity and
161. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (indicating, through the inclusion of race and national origin as
protected classes under Title VII, that a person’s race and/or ethnicity has an important impact on areas
of life such as employment).
162. See id. (showing the government’s ability and willingness to protect individuals from
discrimination based on their race and ethnicity).
163. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-10 (opinion of Powell, J.).
164. Id. at 311-14, 320.
165. See Pacelli, supra note 159, at 572-73 (discussing how Bakke provides guidance as to how
universities can still use race in making admissions decisions; in particular, the Bakke Court noted that
“the use of race as a ‘plus’ one factor could be appropriate”); see also Steven Thomas Poston II, The
Texas Top Ten Percent Plan: The Problem It Causes for The University of Texas and a Potential
Solution, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 257, 265-66 (2008) (describing how the Texas Ten Percent Plan promotes
racial diversity despite Texas’ racially segregated rural and urban high schools, by admitting the top
10% of individual high schools and thereby creating diverse university classes; and how the program
was in fact created in response Texas legislators’ consideration of ethno-racial factors).
166. The U.S. Supreme Court’s pending ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas may change this
conclusion. Fisher will have a substantial impact on the legal landscape. The Court’s holding may
affirm that all of the current strategies available to post-secondary schools remain as options or it may
curtail (or even prohibit) the future use of ethno-racial criteria in college admissions decisions. My
assessment of the implications of the Fisher decision will be the subject of a future law review article.
167. See Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at The University of Texas: An
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
437, 440-41, 444-46 (2011) (discussing the introduction of diversity as a compelling state interest in
constitutional law through Bakke).
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race directly. 168 The Bakke Court’s broad-based notion of diversity that is not
limited to ethnicity and race is, like the other proxies that I analyze, insufficient to
do the work necessary to accomplish the inclusion of a meaningful number of
historically underrepresented ethno-racial minorities in academic institutions of
higher education. The diversity goal casts a net that is too broad regarding who can
be included under the heading. This shift in focus is evident from the language of
the Bakke opinion, which asserts that “[e]thnic diversity . . . is only one element in
a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogeneous student body.” 169 Bakke’s widening of the circle waters down the
goal of improving access to equal educational opportunities for certain minorities
especially African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans.
In the years that followed Bakke, there were a number of political shifts that
took place. There were, for example, substantial moves in states such as
California, 170 Texas, and Florida toward further curtailing the use of affirmative
action, which impacted whether ethno-race-conscious criteria could be relied upon
in schools’ admissions processes. In Texas, the further entrenchment of a negative
view towards any express reliance on ethno-race-based factors in admissions
policies culminated in the case Hopwood v. Texas. 171
B. Hopwood and the Design of the Texas Ten Percent Plan
The Texas Top Ten Percent Plan was instituted in 1997, in the wake of
Hopwood v. Texas. 172 The Hopwood court rejected Justice Powell’s conclusion in
Bakke that consideration of race or ethnicity by a university to achieve diversity in
its student body is a compelling interest that satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. 173 Specifically, the Hopwood court, in ruling on the
constitutionality of the admissions program at the University of Texas at Austin
Law School (“UT Law School”), held:
[T]he University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a

168. See Jacques Steinberg, Using Synonyms for Race, College Strives for Diversity, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/08/us/using-synonyms-for-race-college-strives-fordiversity.html (explaining how admissions officers at Rice University used various means to include
diverse candidates despite not being allowed to use terms like “black,” “Latino,” “minority,” etc., in
their admissions decisions).
169. 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.).
170. See California Proposition 209, California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election Nov. 5, 1996,
(enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”).
171. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
172. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2010). For the bill’s history, see H.B. 588, 1997 Leg.,
75
Reg.
Sess.
(Tex.
1997),
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=75R&Bill=HB588.
173. See 78 F.3d at 948 (“In sum, the use of race to achieve a diverse student body, whether as a
proxy for permissible characteristics, simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough to meet the
steep standard of strict scrutiny . . . . [T]he key is that race itself not be taken into account.”).
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factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a
diverse student body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile
environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school’s poor
reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present
effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school. 174

Texas school officials were faced with a substantial challenge after the
announcement of the Hopwood decision. In some ways, Texas’ higher academic
public institutions were confronting a legal dilemma similar to that of Sciences Po
prior to 2001, in that the Fifth Circuit’s 175 interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, like the reigning interpretation of the French Constitution, precluded
the use of ethnicity and race-based policies to achieve diversity in their student
populations. Like Sciences Po, in confronting a legal environment that constrains
the use of language and strategies that explicitly reference ethnicity and race, U.S.
universities and colleges generally have not abandoned the objective of achieving
ethno-racial diversity in their student admissions, but instead have crafted creative
ways to accomplish this goal. 176 Texas provides one example of this ingenuity and
dedication. After Hopwood, education and government officials began devising a
way to maintain a certain number of underrepresented minority students admitted
to public higher education institutions without explicitly referencing the ethnic and
racial criteria schools had relied upon in the past as part of the admissions
process. 177 In short, the academic institutions sought to find an approach that would
somehow capture the underrepresented minority population, yet operate in balance
with the need for school administrators to maintain control over setting admissions
criteria. 178
Prior to Hopwood, Texas public colleges and universities utilized various
policies that allowed admissions committees to take into account ethno-racial
factors in their respective decision-making processes. 179 Given that UT Law

174. Id. at 962.
175. Hopwood was heard by a three-judge panel in which Judge Smith, joined by Judge Demoss,
wrote the court’s opinion. Id. at 934. Judge Wiener did not join the panel’s holding that race may not be
used as a factor in admissions decisions and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 962-68 (Wiener, J.,
concurring).
176. See, e.g., Richard Kahlenberg, New Ways to Achieve Diversity in California, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. BLOGS (Nov. 22, 2010, 11:23 AM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/new-ways-to-achievediversity-in-california/27920 (describing California’s percentage plan and the consideration of
socioeconomic obstacles as an admissions criterion); see also Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1628 (2003) [hereinafter Bell, Diversity’s Distractions] (describing how the
majority in Gratz expressed favor towards percentage plans in states like Texas, California, and Florida).
177. See Steinberg, supra note 168 (describing how Rice University in Texas sought to achieve
diversity in admissions post-Hopwood).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935-38 (describing the admissions procedure for minority
applicants to UT Law School, which gave minority applications more extensive review and
consideration by the committee than other applicant files; additionally, UT Law School lowered general
standards of admission for minority candidates, with the end goal of admitting a class comprised of 10%
Mexican American students and 5% black students).
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School’s program was the subject of the Hopwood case, it can serve as an example
of the admissions policies that were permissible in a pre-Hopwood legal
environment. Hopwood involved several white Texas residents who sought
admission to UT Law School. 180 The Hopwood plaintiffs claimed that the design of
UT Law School’s admissions program operated to benefit Mexican Americans and
African Americans to the detriment of white applicants and others who were not
within the favored ethno-racial categories. 181 UT Law School relied upon a mixture
of hard and soft factors in rendering admissions decisions. These factors consisted
of a candidate’s Texas Index (“TI”), which is composed of the individual’s LSAT
score and undergraduate GPA, 182 undergraduate institution, undergraduate major,
residency, “background,” and “life experiences.” 183 Several aspects of UT Law
School’s program reflected a consideration of ethno-racial factors including: (i) the
preliminary review of Mexican American and African American candidates’ files
by a special committee who made recommendations to the full admissions
committee, 184 (ii) the downward adjustment of the permitted TI score for the
admission of applicants within the target minority group, 185 (iii) the placement of
the target minority applicants onto a separate waiting list from those of non-target
applicants, 186 (iv) the ongoing reference to the target minority candidate waiting list
in conjunction with issuing acceptances to fill out the remaining admission slots for
the entering class, 187 and (v) the stating of a desired percentage of target minority
applicants to be admitted for each academic year. 188 With the Hopwood ruling,
these ethnicity- and race-sensitive machinations were no longer permissible
because the court concluded that “any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law
school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment,” 189 and, further, that “Justice Powell’s
argument . . . has never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or
any other case.” 190 Although Hopwood concerned UT’s Law School, its impact was
far-reaching. Consequently, after 1996, any public higher education admissions
program in the State of Texas that expressly utilized racial and ethnic criteria was
in jeopardy. 191
Faced with these limitations, Texas created an approach that relied upon

180. Id. at 938.
181. Id. at 934-35.
182. Id. at 935.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 936, 937.
185. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 (comparing the presumptive TI admission score for resident whites
and non-preferred minorities of 199 to the presumptive TI admission score of Mexican Americans and
blacks of 189).
186. Id. at 938.
187. Id. at 938 & n.11.
188. Id. at 937.
189. Id. at 944.
190. Id.
191. See Thompson & Schiff, supra note 167, at 458, 472 (describing the race-neutral means adopted
by UT Austin post-Hopwood in order to achieve diversity).
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geography, demographics, high school academic evaluative factors, and the
awarding of an arbitrary percentage of students the “prize” of attending a Texas
public university or college of their choice. This approach was encapsulated in
House Bill 588. On May 20, 1997, 192 George W. Bush, then Governor of Texas,
signed into law HB 588, which became known as the Texas Top Ten Percent
Plan. 193 Under the percentage plan, as originally implemented, 194 Texas high school
students within the top 10% of their graduating class were granted automatic
admission to the public state colleges and universities of their choice. The relevant
language in the Texas Code provides:
[E]ach general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant
for admission to the institution as an undergraduate student if the
applicant graduated with a grade point average in the top 10[%] of
the student’s high school graduating class in one of the two school
years preceding the academic year for which the applicant is
applying for admission and . . . the applicant graduated from a public
or private high school in this state accredited by a generally
recognized accredited organization or from a high school operated
by the United States Department of Defense. 195

In order to understand how the Texas Plan operates as a proxy strategy, it is
first important to note that it was designed with the severe racial and ethnic
segregation that plagues the State of Texas in mind. Law professor and proponent
of the scheme Michael Olivas predicted the measure would be “particularly
efficacious in the State of Texas . . . as a result of the extreme racial isolation of its
high schools” and would work to include previously marginalized students of
schools in urban centers and in rural regions. 196 It is clear that the continued success
of the plan is predicated on the need for hyper-residential segregation to remain the
status quo. The Ten Percent Plan applies to the entire State of Texas, and is facially
race-neutral because the beneficiaries are determined according to high school rank
and geographic region. 197 Given that within the state there are numerous high

192. H.B. 588, 1997 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess (Tex. 1997).
193. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803.
194. For information about recent modifications to the Texas Plan, see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
51.803 (a-1)-(a-3), which added an amendment limiting the number of students who are automatically
granted admission to UT Austin under the program to 75% of all the seats allocated for Texas residents.
This cap went into effect for the 2011-2012 academic year and is set to expire by the 2015-2016
academic year. Id. See also Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56 (describing the 2010 amendment to the Texas
Ten Percent Plan).
195. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a).
196. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten
Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 326-27 (2001) (quoting Hearings on H.B. 588 Before the H.
Higher Educ. Comm., 1997 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. (Tex. Mar. 18, 1997) (testimony of Michael Olivas)).
197. See id. at 326-28 (noting that the bill is race-neutral and that test scores were eliminated as an
admissions criteria for students graduating in the top 10% of their high school class); see also Poston II,
supra note 165, at 265-266 (explaining the details of the Texas Ten Percent Plan).
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schools in which the student population is all black or Latino, 198 a policy which
admits the top 10% from every high school ensures that a substantial number of
black and Latino students will be captured by this approach. The so-called
“neutral” factors (namely, residency, high school rank) serve as proxies for ethnoracial factors in that their application to the eligible Texas student population
enables post-secondary academic institutions to achieve ethno-racial diversity
without expressly referencing ethno-racial characteristics. A focus report completed
in 2005 by a committee of the Texas House of Representatives appointed to assess
the impact of the program and whether it should be continued 199 reinforced the
State’s reliance on the proxy strategy, noting that the purpose of the plan is “[t]o
broaden access to public higher education institutions by promoting greater
geographic, socioeconomic, and racial/ethnic representation without using race as
an admissions criterion.” 200
The proxy approach gave Texas schools the ability to achieve their broad
goals of serving their student communities and providing a wide base of the Texas
population access to premier state schools, without running afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI, as interpreted by the
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood.
1. The Effectiveness of the Texas Plan: Increasing Ethno-Racial Diversity
and Access to Education Opportunities for Underrepresented Ethno-Racial
Minorities in the United States
In contrast to the CEP program, which only applies to those regions selected
by Sciences Po from the list of zones previously outlined by the French
government, 201 the Texas Plan applies equally to the entire state in conformity with
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 202 The program’s broad
application suggests that it should have an impressive impact on the areas of
education access and equality; however, the available empirical data and focus
reports do not support this conclusion. At best, the Texas Plan has functioned to
assist administrators in maintaining the enrollment of underrepresented minorities
at several key institutions in a legal environment that precluded the consideration of
198. See CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR., HIGH
SCHOOL GRADUATION IN TEXAS 4 (2006), available at www.edweek.org/media/texas_eperc.pdf (citing
statistics that show the degree of racial isolation in high schools in Texas’ largest districts, including
Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio, is more than twice the average U.S. racial segregation level); see also
Texas Education Report Card, REALIZE THE DREAM: QUALITY EDUCATION IS A CIVIL RIGHT,
www.realizethedream.org/reports/states/texas/html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (“Texas is the 13th most
segregated state for African Americans . . .[and] the 2nd most segregated state for Hispanics . . . .”).
199. RITA BARR, TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE RESEARCH ORG, FOCUS REPORT:
SHOULD TEXAS CHANGE THE TOP 10 PERCENT LAW?, NO. 79-7, at 1 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/topten79-7.pdf.
200. Id. at 3.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 80-90 (describing the CEP program and targeted zones).
202. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (stating that the Ten Percent Plan applies to any
accredited public or private high school, or a high school which is run by the Department of Defense, in
the State of Texas).
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ethno-racial factors in admissions policies. 203 Like Science’s Po’s proxy approach,
Texas’ plan has had a limited effect from the standpoint of achieving concrete gains
in admitting underrepresented minority populations to quality education
institutions. Rather than lauding the Texas Plan as the solution to education
disparity issues, it is more appropriate to view it as an effective backstop measure.
A comparison of minority enrollment numbers at UT Austin before and after the
decision is telling. In 1997 immediately after Hopwood Latino freshman
enrollment decreased 4.3% and black freshman enrollment decreased 33.8%. 204 By
contrast after implementation of the Ten Percent Plan from 2003 to 2004, “AfricanAmerican enrollment increased from 4.1% to 4.5%, Hispanic enrollment increased
from 16.3% to 16.9%, and Asian-American enrollment increased from 17.6% to
17.9%.” 205
Texas Tech also reported an increase in minority student matriculation from
its level of 13% in 2000 to 16% in 2007. 206 It is also clear that a substantial
percentage of underrepresented minority groups are admitted under the Ten Percent
rubric. With regard to minority admissions across the State of Texas in 2004, “77%
of the enrolled African-American students and 78% of the Hispanic students had
been admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, compared to 62% of Caucasian
students.” 207 There are, however, questions regarding whether the small increases in
minority admissions may be attributed wholly to the Ten Percent Plan rather than to
changing demographics and the concentrated minority recruitment efforts of some
schools. 208 The data suggests that the plan merely functioned to help sustain levels
of student ethno-racial diversity but did not substantially advance the goals of
access and equal opportunity for historically marginalized minorities in the United
States. 209

203. Some commentators maintain that the increases in minority enrollment are due to other factors
such as more concentrated outreach programs and intense recruiting by college officials and not the Ten
Percent Plan. Poston II, supra note 165, at 269. See Steinberg, supra note 168 (discussing generally the
tactics that Rice University uses to increase ethno-racial diversity without formally accounting for race
in its admissions process, including increasing “recruiting at schools with traditionally high minority
populations”).
204. Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
245, 251 (1999). The numbers were equally sobering at Texas A&M which experienced a decrease in
the “freshman enrollment of Hispanic and black students” of “12.6% and 29% respectively.” Id.
205. Angela M. Hough, All Deliberate Ambiguity: The Question of Diversity, College Admissions,
and the Future of the Texas Top-Ten-Percent Plan, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 197, 214 (2006); BARR, supra
note 199, at 3.
206. Poston II, supra note 165, at 268. It is important to bear in mind that these increases may be
attributable, to some extent, to an increasing minority population and the case Grutter v. Bollinger which
held the use of race and ethnicity in admission decisions as constitutional within the limits prescribed by
the decision. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
207. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
208. Poston II, supra note 165, at 269.
209. Texas’ Plan, however, has apparently, from the standpoint of class and geography, improved the
access of students to colleges and universities in the State of Texas. Mark C. Long et al., Policy
Transparency and College Enrollment: Did the Texas Top Ten Percent Law Broaden Access to the
Public Flagships?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 2010, at 82, 96-97 (“[T]he Top Ten
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While the accomplishment of maintaining minority student admission levels
should not be minimized, my thesis is that it is critical to not rely too heavily on
proxy strategies like the Ten Percent Plan to the detriment of actually
accomplishing the goals of true equality and access. True equality requires that
significant numbers of underrepresented minorities have viable and sustainable
entry points into quality post-secondary schools. The histories of the United States
and France have entailed the oppression and exclusion of certain groups (for
example, African Americans and peoples of African heritage in France). The
histories must be a part of the solution. 210 Since the educational disparities that
historically unrepresented groups experience today may be traced in part to the
historical treatment they as a group have endured in France and the United States, it
is appropriate to keep that factor in mind when formulating higher education
admissions policies.
There are other shortcomings of the Texas Plan that highlight the dangers of
depending exclusively on this strategy to tackle the vexing issue of educational
equality. In order to take into account history, post-secondary institutions require
latitude to formulate their admissions policies. One of the main shortcomings of the
Texas Plan is the lack of flexibility it accords to the schools that fall within its
purview. Under the original structure of the plan, students in the top 10% of their
class were given the freedom to select the school of their choice. UT Austin and
Texas A&M, as the state’s flagship schools, tend to be the preferred choices. 211 As
a result of their elite status, these institutions have experienced a substantial decline
in the number of discretionary slots for out-of-state applicants and for in-state
students who fall below the top 10% of their class. In general, the impact on the
geographic make-up of the student admissions for Texas colleges and universities
is remarkable. 212 Of the 10,200 spaces reserved for Texas residents, in 2008, 8,984
students were admitted under the Ten Percent Plan. 213 With respect to UT Austin

Percent Law appears to have broadened access to UT for high schools that traditionally sent fewer
students there, particularly high-poverty and rural schools . . . .”).
210. See TAMMIE O’NEIL & LAURE-HÉLÈNE PIRON, RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO TACKLING
DISCRIMINATION
AND
HORIZONTAL
INEQUALITY
13
(2003),
available
at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/4555.pdf (explaining that by ignoring past discrimination,
otherwise colorblind laws may fail to place discriminated groups on an equal footing, and will continue
to disadvantage certain groups).
211. See generally Poston II, supra note 165, at 258 (“Following the [Ten Percent] Plan’s
implementation, an ever increasing majority of the entering freshman classes at Texas’ two flagship
universities, UT Austin and Texas A&M, are composed of automatic admissions.”); TIENDA ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 52 tbl.5 (noting that students in the top 10% of their class are more likely to apply to
UT Austin and Texas A&M).
212. See generally THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, THE LIEUTENANT
GOVERNOR, AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SB
175
(Dec.
31,
2011),
available
at
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/SB_175_Report_for_2011.pdf
(explaining
the
geographic diversity of Texas Universities and the plans in place to improve the admissions for students
from impoverished areas).
213. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 239 (citing Implementation and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions
Law (HB 588) at the University of Texas at Austin, Demographic Analysis of Entering Freshmen Fall

134

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

specifically, of the seats slated for all Texas residents in 2008, 88% were made up
of students who were admitted under the Ten Percent Plan; 81% of the entering
first year class was composed of Top Ten Percent students. 214 As a result of the
lack of flexibility, schools must overlook many excellent students who, despite
their talent, do not graduate in the top decile of their classes for any number of
reasons which may relate to the competitiveness of the school or the difficulty of
the courses they choose to take in high school. In terms of the impact on
historically underrepresented ethno-racial minorities (for example, Latinos and
African Americans), those who fall within the second or even third decile are likely
to suffer while Caucasians who fall within the second-tier group are likely to be
admitted at a higher rate in comparison. 215
Another shortcoming of the percentage plan is that even though Texas schools
may have experienced a modest increase in minority enrollments since its
introduction, the increase is insufficient in view of the overall goals of achieving
ethno-racial diversity and equality of educational opportunity. 216 Finally, the Plan
relies upon the persistence of ethno-racial segregation in housing and high schools
for its success and, therefore, works against the goal of diminishing this disturbing
social reality. 217
2. Modifications to the Top Ten Percent Plan: The Seventy-Five Percent
Cap
In response to the concerns raised by Texas schools that the Plan leaves them
with little flexibility to decide the composition of their entering classes, the Texas
state legislature opted to modify the Ten Percent Law in 2009. An amendment that
went into effect beginning with the 2011-2012 academic year limits the number of
students who are automatically granted admission to UT Austin under the program
to 75% of all the seats allocated for Texas residents. 218 While students who are

2008, Academic Performance of Top 10% and Non-Top 10% Students Academic Years 2003-2007,
UNIV.
OF
TEX.
AT
AUSTIN
OFFICE
OF
ADMISSIONS,
8
tbl.2
(2008),
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-Report11.pdf. [hereinafter Implementation
and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions Law]).
214. Id. at 227 (citing Implementation and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions Law, supra
note 213, at 8 tbl.2); see also Long et al., supra note 209, at 91 (explaining that there has been a steady
increase in the share of students admitted under the Texas Plan from 41% in 1998 to 54% in 2002).
215. TIENDA ET AL., supra note 25, at 52 tbl. 5.
216. Some commentators have argued that the potential of the plan has not been realized, in some
respects, because there are substantial numbers of minority students who attend high schools in lowincome neighborhoods who do not take advantage of their eligibility under the Ten Percent Plan and fail
to apply for admission to flagship institutions like UT, for example. See, e.g., Long et al., supra note
209, at 96 (stating that “low-income and minority-dominated schools are disproportionately located in
large urban districts,” and discussing the “significant decline in the share of students from urban high
schools enrolling at UT”).
217. Poston II, supra note 165, at 265-66.
218. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a-1). The expiration date for the cap is the 2015-2016
academic year. Id. § 51.803(a-3); Katherine Mangan, Federal Court Throws Out Challenge to U. of
Texas Admissions Policy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 17, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Federal-
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captured within the top 10% ranking are still deemed to qualify for admission, the
legislative change restores some discretion to UT Austin by allowing it to size
down the number of students admitted under the plan, in accordance with following
guidelines:
[B]y percentile rank according to high school graduating class
standing based on grade point average, beginning with the top
percentile rank, until the applicants qualified [for admission to UT]
under [the Top Ten Percent Law] have been offered admission in the
number estimated in good faith by the university as sufficient to fill
75[%] of the university’s enrollment capacity designated for firsttime resident undergraduate students, except that the university must
offer admission to all applicants with the same percentile rank. 219

This adjustment gives UT Austin more latitude; however, it also has the
potential to negatively impact minority admissions because a smaller number may
be automatically captured by the plan. The change also may positively affect
minority admission. It depends upon how the schools exercise their discretion in
filling the new non-designated spaces. The change does not entirely free academic
institutions from judicial scrutiny. 220 Ultimately, what the schools can do with this
new latitude to improve the access of minorities to post-secondary schools depends
upon what the prevailing legal environment permits.
The foregoing sections serve to explain why Texas and Sciences Po adopted
the surrogate strategies of the Ten Percent Plan and the CEP program, respectively,
and highlight some of the limitations of those strategies from the standpoint of
attaining equality in education. The next section explores possibilities for
expanding those approaches, taking into account the legal frameworks (for
example, national laws, legal principles, governing cases) and political climates in
which they operate.
III. EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN FRANCE AND THE CURRENT
FRENCH LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Before discussing the relevant laws of France that impact whether the CEP
program may be broadened to have a national reach including other grandes écoles,
it is useful to place France’s concept of equality in context by commenting on an
essential difference between France’s equality laws and those of the United States.
The corrective aspects that are part of the United States’ history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI, and Section 1981(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are not
built into France’s legal background. The majority of the French laws and

Court-Throws-Out/48023/.
219. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a-1).
220. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 196 (discussing the legal requirements and
constitutionality of the Ten Percent Plan).

136

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

documents highlighted herein were not devised to address the history of slavery
and colonization that France imposed on peoples of African descent. Thus, there is
no foundational juridico-historical basis to the laws to make the argument that
policies of ethno-race-based affirmative action should be allowed and not read as
being in conflict with France’s equality laws. 221 Whereas the United States’
equality laws, as I discuss later, grow out of a history of de jure and de facto
segregation and discrimination, the main historical referents for the relevant French
laws are the French Revolution and the desire to supplant a system heavily
influenced by wealth, royalty, and clericalism. 222 Unlike the laws of the United
States which historically have allowed for the remedial legislation of affirmative
action policies, civil rights laws, Title VI, and Title VII stand in conjunction with
the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, thereby permitting ethno-race-based initiatives in certain contexts, 223
France’s legal universe prohibits any carving out of a similar type of legal space to
protect or assist those of African heritage in achieving de facto equality. 224 Given
the present construction of French law, the approach France must take to address its
ethno-racial (in)equality issues diverges from that of the United States. As the
following discussion demonstrates, under the Republic’s current legal framework,
France must adopt substitutes for ethno-race-conscious criteria when it seeks to
implement a program that is, in part, designed to benefit a socially and
economically disadvantaged community such as the African French residents of
France.
Given the current constraints of France’s laws, which do not allow for an
express consideration of ethno-racial criteria, in order for substantial gains to be
221. See generally Cynthia A. Vroom, Equal Protection Versus the Principle of Equality: American
and French Views on Equality in the Law, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 199, 214-21 (1992) (overviewing the
application of France’s equality laws and France’s notions of differential treatment).
222. See id. at 205 (“The French historical experience has been different than [the United States’] and
has resulted in a different notion of legal equality. The principle of equality contained in article 6 of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man was born of the French Revolution, a reaction to the excesses of the
monarchy, feudal privileges of the nobility, and vastly disproportionate distribution of wealth and
property.”); see also ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 313 (“The French Revolution was first and foremost
about equality. Particularly infuriating for the great majority of French people at the time . . . was the
privileged legal status enjoyed by the clergy and the nobility.”).
223. See Jared M. Mellot, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After
Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2006) (explaining that
American employers and universities have been using race-centered hiring and admissions policies in
order to increase diversity); Lieberman, supra note 81, at 200-03 (explaining how American
employment discrimination law went from being color-blind to allowing affirmative action and other
race-based initiatives).
224. Lieberman, supra note 81, at 193 (“France has carefully avoided classifying citizens by race or
ethnicity . . . . Consequently, France has not explicitly adopted policies to target racially defined
minorities, although social policies such as Educational Priority Zones . . . have come to be recognized
as de facto instances of racial targeting.”); see also ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 313 (“Given the
traditional republican commitment to strict legal equality, legislative attempts to assist disadvantaged
groups are particularly problematic.”); Matlack, supra note 62 (“France has long opposed affirmative
action on the grounds that—since the constitution requires everyone to be treated equally, and since
everyone is fully French—no such programs are needed.”).
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made in the areas of increased access and improvement of educational
opportunities for the marginalized population of peoples of African heritage,
France needs to revisit the issue of amending the relevant laws to allow ethno-racebased policies to be effected. Before examining the issue of amending the French
Constitution, a discussion of the panoply of laws and principles that are at stake in
any proposed affirmative action policies is warranted.
A. French Laws and the Legal System: Legal Documents and Principles Bearing
on Equality of Educational Opportunity and Access
It is necessary to begin by identifying: (i) the chief legal documents and laws
that are implicated in any equality of educational opportunity project that France
undertakes to be more inclusive of ethno-racial minorities, and (ii) the fundamental
principles and values articulated in those laws and documents that are germane to
the aforementioned project.
French constitutional law scholar John Bell highlights several essential
documents in commenting upon the principle of equality in the French legal
system. 225 These documents are the 1958 Constitution of the French Fifth Republic
(in particular, the Preamble and Article 1), 226 the Declaration of the Rights of Man
of 1789, 227 and the Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution of the Fourth
Republic (the “Preamble to the 1946 Constitution”). 228
Several provisions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man are relevant to the
French Republic’s goal of ensuring the equality of its citizens and, depending upon
their interpretation, may hinder a project to amend France’s laws to include
equality provisions that expressly reference ethno-racial classifications aimed at
addressing the inequities in education, wealth, employment, and social acceptance
that many individuals of African heritage in France currently experience. From this
standpoint, the most significant of the Declaration Articles are Article 1 and Article
6:
Article First. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.
Social distinctions may be based only on considerations of the
common good. . . .
Article 6. The Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens
have the right to take part, personally or through their
representatives, in its making. It must be the same for all, whether it
protects or punishes. All citizens being equal in its eyes, shall be
equally eligible to all high offices, public positions and
employments, according to their ability, and without other distinction

225. BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 57-77.
226. 1958 CONST. (Fr.).
227. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.).
228. 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.). Combined, these legal sources along with the Charter for the
Environment of 2004 and other principles and instruments referenced in the aforementioned documents,
are referred to as le bloc de constitutionalité (the constitutional block). ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 209.

138

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

than that of their virtues and talents. 229

The foregoing provisions contain the language of formal equality that France
emphasizes in heralding the guarantees it makes to its citizens. 230 What is striking
about these sections is the absence of language that would allow for recognition of
gender, ethno-racial, class or religious distinctions. 231 Meritocracy appears to be
paramount given the language in Article 6, which only allows for a consideration of
individuals based on their abilities in connection with the distribution of certain
social goods. From a legal standpoint, this provision for the equal treatment of
individuals is admirable. The problem arises when the experiences of certain
sectors of the population indicate that everyone is not being treated on an equal
basis. This disparity is the dilemma that many African French people face. 232
The relevant sections of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, in terms of
equality of educational opportunity provide:
Section 1. In the morrow of the victory achieved by the free peoples
over the regimes that had sought to enslave and degrade humanity,
the people of France proclaim anew that each human being, without
distinction of race, religion or creed, possess sacred and inalienable
rights. They solemnly reaffirm the rights and freedoms of man and
the citizen enshrined in the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the
fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic.
Section 13. The Nation guarantees equal access for children and
adults to instruction, vocational training and culture. The provision
of free, public and secular education at all levels is a duty of the
State. 233

In comparison with the United States’ constitutional guarantees, which do not
include a provision regarding education framed in similar terms, Section 13 of the
1946 French Constitution marks a substantial difference. Section 13 raises access to
education to the level of a fundamental constitutional right. 234 In contrast, the

229. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.).
230. Id.
231. Articles One and Six specifically state that no distinctions may be made other than on the merits
of a person’s talents. Id.
232. See Matlack, supra note 62 (“France has long opposed affirmative action on the grounds that—
since the constitution requires everyone to be treated equally, and since everyone is fully French—no
such programs are needed. A beautiful idea, but it ignores the reality of the ghettos, which impede
assimilation.”); Vroom, supra note 221, at 222 (“Yet equality of result as a goal also has its limits.
France has not been immune to the shadow of racism, and with its increasingly large immigrant
population there is a visible gap between opportunities available to ethnic French and those available to
immigrants from different cultures . . . .”).
233. 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (emphasis added).
234. Id. § 13 (“The Nation guarantees equal access for children and adults to instruction, vocational
training and culture. The provision of free, public and secular education at all levels is a duty of the
state.”).
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United States has moved away from this idea of education as a right guaranteed by
the Constitution, as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 235 In Rodriguez, the Court
expressly held that education is not a fundamental right protected by the United
States Constitution 236 stating that “at least where wealth is involved, the Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.
Nor, indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can
any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense.” 237
The sentiment of the Rodriguez Court is counter to that expressed in Section
13. Perhaps then, even more so for France than the United States, there is leverage
to make a constitutional claim regarding the disparities in education that the
government’s failure to provide meaningful opportunities for a substantial portion
of the African French population to obtain a quality post-secondary education is a
violation of their constitutional rights. Social unrest, the state of schools situated
within residential areas populated by African French people, 238 and the apparent
dearth of African French individuals in positions of economic affluence and
political power, 239 suggest that the ideal embodied in the language of Section 13 is
currently not being met. Therefore, strategies which would facilitate the fulfillment
of the constitutional guarantee (for example, ethno-race-based policies) must be
given more weight. The Sciences Po program is only one program. It is woefully
insufficient to address the inequalities in education that the African French
population experience as compared with the majority white French population. As I
argue that the French Constitution should be amended to allow for reference to
ethno-racial categories in connection with formulating future affirmative action
policies, Section 13 could serve as the predominant legal basis for this amendment.
While the foregoing documents are important touchstones of the French
Republic’s identity, Article 1 of the 1958 French Constitution is the provision often
cited as establishing and encapsulating the notion of formal equality. 240 The idea
that all French citizens are equal before the law is central to France’s legal order. 241
Article 1 provides in relevant part: “France shall be an indivisible, secular,
democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the

235. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226-30 (1982) (holding that public
schools are prohibited from denying immigrant students access to public education).
236. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in subsequent decisions,
including Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328 n.7 (1983); and Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458.
237. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24.
238. See Matlack et al., supra note 62 (detailing the circumstances causing the 2005 riots in
residential Parisian suburbs by young adults from African and Arab families, stating “[m]ix in racial
discrimination, crumbling education systems, and scant representation of ethnic minorities among the
political and business elite, and it’s easy to see why young immigrants are alienated”).
239. Id.
240. BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 199 (using an edition of the 1958
Constitution that places the text of Article 1 into Article 2, Bell states that equality “is now enshrined in
article 2 of the Fifth Republic Constitution of 1958 . . . .”).
241. Id. (“Equality has stood at the core of the French republican tradition ever since the Revolution
of 1789.”).
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law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It
shall be organized on a decentralized basis . . . .” 242
It is, in particular, because of the language in Article 1, and similar language
in Section 1 of the 1946 Constitution, 243 that the French government and other
institutions that seek to find ways to be more inclusive of ethno-racial minorities,
through hiring policies or educational programs, must resort to alternative strategies
that do not explicitly reference ethnicity or race. 244 French legal scholar, Gwénaële
Calvès explains that “[t]he word ‘distinction’ [as used in the French Constitution]
must . . . be understood in its original and most basic sense: current legislation
prohibits—except under very restricted circumstances—labeling, classifying, or
counting citizens by their religious affiliations, ‘racial’ characteristics, or national
origins.” 245 In accord with this view, French scholar Daniel Sabbagh concludes that
because of the language of Article 1, which precludes any distinction based upon
origin, race, or religion, “corrective or ‘remedial’ uses of race by state authorities”
will be treated by French courts as “‘invidious’. . . and simply ruled out.” 246
While it is clear that France opposes racial and ethnic discrimination 247 and
that the country has a deep commitment to the idea of equality for all individuals
residing within its borders, 248 it is also evident that people in France encounter
ethnic and racial discrimination, 249 which can have a negative impact on their
quality of life. As the current French legal terrain stands, there is no constitutional
amendment on the agenda to change this reality, which means that any policies
designed to address ethno-racial disparities must conform to the prevailing legal
framework. The architects of the Sciences Po’s CEP program took the constraints
242. 1958 CONST. (Fr.) (emphasis added).
243. 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (“[T]he people of France proclaim anew that each human being,
without distinction of race, religion or creed, possesses sacred and inalienable rights.”).
244. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 1-2.
245. Calvès, supra note 89, at 219.
246. Daniel Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics: Developments in the French
FOUND.,
1,
(Feb.
2008),
Controversy,
FRENCH-AM.
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/sabbagh_ethnicstatistics_brief_en.pdf [hereinafter
Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics].
247. In addition to signing off on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination [ICERD.], Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (signed by France Jul. 28, 1971),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cerd.pdf, France has added anti-discrimination
measures to its Criminal Code, CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 225-1 (Fr.), and the Act of July 1972, Loi 72546 du 1er juillet 1972 relative à la lutte contre le racisme [Law 72-546 of July 1, 1972 pertaining to the
Fight Against Racism], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Jul. 2, 1972, p. 6803. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, French Legislation Against Racism and
Discrimination, 20 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 371, 372 (1994).
248. See Costa-Lascoux, supra note 247, at 372 (quoting Loi 89-548 du 2 août 1989 relative aux
conditions de séjour et d’entrée des étrangers en France [Law 89-548 of August 5, 1989 on the
conditions of stay and entry of foreigners in France] J.O., Aug. 8, 1989) (“From its inception, the French
Republic has affirmed the principles of hospitality and tolerance which are its own. Consequently, it
prohibits and condemns racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia in all the territories under its authority.”).
249. See id. at 378 (providing examples of racist incidents that have led to litigation in France); BEN
JELLOUN, supra note 49, at 47-61 (commenting on ethnic and race-based prejudice experienced by
peoples of African heritage in France during the colonial period).
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of the legal landscape into account when drafting their initiative. 250 In fact, the
school administrators at the Sciences Po looked to the American political and legal
scene for criticisms of U.S. affirmative action education policies and sought to take
some of the prominent objections into account when crafting their own plan in
order to anticipate and deflect any fatal challenges. 251 Evidence of the influence of
U.S. affirmative action education policies is apparent in the flexible structuring of
the Sciences Po’s approach, which allows for an increase in the number of
admissions to accommodate the CEP track. The creation of new slots is a
significant departure from U.S. programs. Typically U.S. programs have not added
new slots, but merely carved places out of already existing admission slots, 252
leading to criticisms that minority students, benefitting from affirmative action,
were taking the spaces of white candidates. 253 Bakke gave voice to these criticisms.
In Bakke, the Court viewed the Medical School’s race-conscious admissions
program as operating to decrease the number of admission slots that were
previously available to white students, commenting that “some individuals are
excluded from enjoyment of a state-provided benefit—admission to the Medical
School—they otherwise would receive.” 254 That is, the Court accepted the view
that, with the implementation of the special program, white students were only
allowed to compete for eighty-four out of the one hundred available seats in the
entering class whereas minority students were purportedly allowed to compete for
every available seat. 255 The Bakke court emphasized that race-based admissions
programs must be evaluated in terms of whether they place undue pressures on
“innocent persons” who are asked “to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not
of their making.” 256 The Court struck down the Medical School’s program because:
[The program] tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano
that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats

250. See, e.g., Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 2-3 (explaining that Sciences Po
looked to the United States in constructing the CEP program to fit within the French Republic system).
251. Id.; see also Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 52 n.37 (offering a
different view on Bakke and the Sciences Po’s policy).
252. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-77 (explaining that the University of California at Davis
Medical School’s admissions process fixed the number of available seats for its entering class while
increasing the number of minorities through a separate admissions program, thereby increasing minority
enrollment from approximately 6% in 1958 to 23% in 1974).
253. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 123 (5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW] (remarking that the majorities in Bakke and Grutter
appeared “paranoid” over the possibility of “unduly trammel[ing] the interests or expectations of
‘innocent’ nonminorities”); see also Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 52
(noting that some opponents of the program criticized it as “flatly abusive,” rather than suggesting
alternatives to achieve a shared goal).
254. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (opinion of Powell, J.).
255. Id. at 289.
256. Id. at 298; see also BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 132-33
(addressing the problems with describing affirmative action programs in terms of “innocents”);
Freeman, supra note 111, at 29-31 (same); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 297, 299-310 (1990) (same).
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in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications,
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for
contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for
special admission seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants
have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class. 257

Cognizant of this criticism, the Sciences Po opted to expand its class sizes to
accommodate the acceptance of CEP students. 258 Due to this structuring of the
program, the CEP plan has thus far survived the political storms surrounding it and
the constitutional challenges and criticisms launched against it. 259 There are,
however, some drawbacks to this approach. First, the broadening of the program to
include more ethno-racial candidates will always be constrained by the financial
resources the school has to expand its class sizes. To the extent that expanded class
sizes may negatively impact the learning experience (e.g., increased teacher–
student ratios), it may not be desirable to continue to modify an admissions
program in this way. Second, at some point, courts and the general populace may
no longer accept the view that the newly created spaces are different from the
admission slots that were previously in place. If this happens, the Sciences Po will
have to contend with arguments that the new slots along with the previously
existing ones should be open for competition by all candidates. Third, the approach
reinforces the idea that the status quo pool of applicants (that is, white middle- and
upper-class students) are entitled to a certain number of seats at the Sciences Po.
That is, notwithstanding the implementation of the CEP plan, the Sciences Po is
still primarily operating from the philosophy that admission slots are “merit badges
or prizes for some innate talent or past performance or industry,” 260 rather than
“opportunities that are properly offered to those who show the most promise of
future contribution to goals the university rightfully seeks to advance.” 261 Given
this perspective, the impact that the institution can have on increasing educational
opportunities for ethno-racial minorities and expanding ethno-racial diversity will
remain severely limited. Fourth, the dedication of a specified number of spaces to
CEP students that are awarded according to alternative criteria creates the special
track problem criticized by the Bakke court, which led to the Medical School’s

257. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
258. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 52 (explaining that Sciences
Po did not decrease the number of spaces reserved for students who gained admission under the
traditional process).
259. Id. at 52 n.6 (citing unsuccessful challenges to the policy); Amelia Gentleman, France Rules on
Elite Education for Poorest: University May be Prevented from Targeting Pupils in Deprived Areas,
GUARDIAN
(U.K.),
Nov.
6
2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/06/highereducation.internationaleducationnews?INTCMP=
SRCH (reporting on an imminent ruling on the admissions policy by the Paris appeals court); PolakowSuransky, supra note 99 (recalling that the admissions policy withstood an immediate legal challenge
from the National Interuniversity Union in a Paris appeals court).
260. Dworkin, supra note 109.
261. Id.
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admissions program being held unconstitutional. 262 So, while the Sciences Po’s
plan avoids one potential problem, its structure remains vulnerable to a pitfall that
the Bakke case highlights.
Nevertheless, thanks to the overall careful design of the program, it has
weathered the constitutional challenges it has confronted thus far. A look at the
legal challenges posed and the resulting endorsements and legal restrictions placed
on the program is useful for identifying the further actions that must be taken in
order to accomplish educational equality in France.
B. Signs of Change: Support for and Resistance to the CEP Program
1. France’s Constitutional Council, the French Parliament, and Court
Challenges
There are signs that an ideological shift is underway in certain sectors of
France that allows for conversations regarding affirmative action to take place and
helps to sustain a radical undertaking like the CEP plan. Signs of ideological
change are found in the legal system’s responses to challenges to the CEP program
and legislative action. The CEP initiative met and survived several legal tests. A
conservative right-wing student group, the National Interuniversity Union
(“UNI”), 263 brought an unsuccessful court challenge against the plan in its early
days. 264 UNI charged that the creation of an alternative admissions track that was
defined solely according to the locale in which students reside violated the “French
constitutional guarantee of equal opportunity.” 265 One of the UNI members
complained that the program “goes against the core French tradition of equality of
opportunity,” remarking that “[t]he law guarantees that all lycée [high school]
students should be treated equally, but Sciences-Po [sic] has decided to ignore that
principle.” 266 A Paris court of appeals rejected that argument in November 2003,
opting instead to affirm the constitutionality of the program. 267
Another sign of change is the French Parliament’s passage of a bill on June
28, 2001 in support of the program. Following its passage, the Conseil
constitutionnel, or Constitutional Council, ex officio raised the matter of the
legislation’s constitutionality. 268 The law, referred to as Article 14, 269 provides in

262. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
263. UNI is a major right-wing student union in France. Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99.
264. Gentleman, supra note 259. In 2001, the conservative group’s request for an immediate hearing
was turned down by the Conseil Constitutionnel. Daley, supra note 20.
265. Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99.
266. Gentleman, supra note 259.
267. Burton Bollag, A French Court Supports an Elite University’s Affirmative-Action Program,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 21, 2003), http://chronicle.com/article/A-French-Court-Supportsan/24832; Gentleman, supra note 259; Aisha Labi, Lessons From—Quelle Horreur!—les Americains,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2005), http://chronicle.com/article/Lessons-From-Quelle/13604;
Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99.
268. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 335.
269. Id.
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relevant part:
The governing board of the Institute of Political Studies of Paris may
determine, by derogation from the provisions of the third paragraph
of article L. 621-3, the conditions and procedures for admission to
the Institute’s programs as well as the organization of its programs of
study for the first cycles of its doctoral program. It may adopt
admissions procedures that include particular modalities aimed at
assuring the recruitment of a diverse student body from among
undergraduate students. The admissions procedures may be
implemented by way of agreements concluded with French or
foreign secondary or higher educational institutions, in order to
involve them in the Institute’s recruitment of their pupils or students
. . . . 270

Before commenting on the outcome of this challenge, some explanation
regarding France’s high advisory legal institution, the Constitutional Council, is
necessary. 271 Scholar John Bell examined certain decisions of the Constitutional
Council and concluded that “the Conseil’s notion of equality is . . . mainly
concerned with non-discrimination in relation to specific constitutional values . . .
rather than with requiring the legislator to seek substantive equality of outcomes,

270. Id. For a reproduction of the law, see infra Appendix (quoting Constitutional Court decision No.
2001-450DC, supra note 28, ¶ 32 (Fr.)). The official French version is available online at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-pardate/decisions-depuis-1959/2001/2001-450-dc/decision-n-2001-450-dc-du-11-juillet-2001.508.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2012).
271. The Constitutional Council is charged with reviewing the legislation of the Parliament and the
executive. BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 31-32. Although a “third branch” of
government, the Consitutional Council is not exactly the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court. See id.
at 23, 27-28, 30-32, 55, 242 (identifying some of the main differences between the U.S. and French
consitutional institutions). The chief role of the Conseil is to keep the other organs of the government
within the limits of the French constitution. Id. at 21, 242. The Constitutional Council, similar to the
U.S. Supreme Court, is a “supervisor of last resort” when a fundamental right is violated or threatened.
Id. at 242. The Parliament has the leading responsibility of giving substance to fundamental rights. Id.
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council is “limited to reviewing lois before they are promulgated;
once promulgated a loi becomes immune from challenge in the ordinary courts.” Id. at 55. Bell describes
the nominating process for the Constitutional Council as follows:
[T]here are no criteria for membership of the Conseil other than having been nominated
by either the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate, or the President of the
National Assembly. One member is appointed by each of these three every three years for a
non-renewable term of nine years. . . . In addition, all past Presidents of the Republic are
members for life.
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 34.
Despite the fact that past Presidents of the Republic are technically members of the court, none
have assumed their seats since the Fifth Republic. The seated members, therefore, number nine. Id. at
34, 40. The President of the Republic appoints three members. Three members are appointed by the
President of the National Assembly and three members are appointed by the President of the Senate.
Stéphanie Cottin & Jérôme Rabenou, Researching French Law, GLOBALEX (May 2005),
http://nyulawglobal.org/globalex/france.htm.
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resources, or opportunities.” 272
While the foregoing assessment suggests that the Council would not be in
favor of an affirmative action policy, even one that is not based on race or ethnicity,
the Constitutional Council nonetheless issued a decision on July 11, 2001 (Decision
no. 2001-450 DC) holding that the June 28, 2001 French Parliament law under the
education code, which upholds the Sciences Po’s action to implement the CEP
plan, is in conformity with the French constitution: “[O]n the condition that [the
admissions criteria implemented for the CEP program] are based on objective
criteria of a nature to guarantee respect for the constitutional requirement of equal
access to education.” 273
In so ruling, the Council specifically referenced Section 13 of the Preamble to
the 1946 Constitution, 274 underscoring that this provision is the appropriate focal
point for discussions involving French laws and any radical changes needed to
attain diversity in educational institutions. The Council’s ruling is encouraging and
suggests that, perhaps, additional equalizing socio-economic policies and programs
could be developed within the parameters of currently existing French laws and be
constitutionally valid. The ruling also supports my argument that formal equality,
while important, only goes so far. Article 14 indicates the French legislature’s
recognition of the limits of formal equality. 275 The ruling also marks a shift in the
French government’s focus towards the objectives of “equality of outcomes,
resources, [and] opportunities.” 276 This shift may allow institutions to effect deep
meaningful changes in French society to address the disparities that certain ethnoracial minorities experience. The Council does not go so far as to state that the
“modalities” that may be adopted can be expanded to take note of ethno-racial
classifications. If this variation were possible, then French universities would not
be limited to working within pre-established segregated zones to achieve their
objectives. That is, post-secondary institutions could specifically delineate the
ethno-racial population that they are seeking to target without reference to
geographic location, make the case that this population has been denied equal
access to education and is in need of special assistance to alter the status quo, and
track the status of the target group as the various programs move forward. The
potential restrictive aspect of the Council’s ruling in relation to the foregoing
proposed plan concerns the question that is left unanswered: How does the Council
define “objective criteria” that is “of a nature” that is in conformity with the equal
access requirement of Section 13?
While the French legal establishment’s responses to the Sciences Po’s plan
thus far are affirming, the restrictions on making distinctions between people on the
basis of race and ethnicity remain intact. Therefore, there are substantial limitations
on what can be accomplished from the standpoint of the goal of ethno-racial

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 200.
Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC, supra note 28, at 336.
Id.
Id.
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 200.
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inclusion and access at the post-secondary education level. It is my argument that if
the Republic wishes to improve or equalize the access that African minorities have
to educational opportunities at prestigious French universities then it will need to
implement policies utilizing ethno-race-conscious criteria. In order to do this, it is
necessary to amend the French constitution. My conclusion is in keeping with
recent proposals that have emerged in the context of France’s ongoing debate about
national identity, the direction of the nation, and its policies concerning disaffected
sectors.
2.

Amending the French Constitution

Recognition that the French Republic’s goal of egalité has not yet been
realized, fear of ongoing socio-political unrest similar to the uprisings in 2005, and
awareness of other national models (for example, the United States’ model) for
addressing ethno-racial inequality motivated French President Nicolas Sarkozy 277
to explore more aggressive options for changing the status quo in France. 278 For
example, while serving as Minister of Finance in 2004, Sarkozy announced his
intention to investigate whether Article 1 and the Preamble to the 1958 French
Constitution should be amended to allow for affirmative action policies to be
introduced in France. 279
President Sarkozy selected respected political figure Simone Veil 280 to
organize and head a committee that would determine whether the Preamble should
be amended. 281 In December 2008, the committee issued its report (the “Veil
Constitution Report”). 282 After extensively studying affirmative action policies in

277. Sarkozy was president from 2007 until 2012. Times Topics: Nicolas Sarkozy, N.Y. TIMES (May
15, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/nicolas_sarkozy/index.html. In
April 2012, France elected François Hollande as its new president. Id.
278. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Dorminey, France Says Non to Affirmative Action: Will the U.S. Do the
July,
2009,
at
42,
43,
available
at
http://www.fedSame?,
ENGAGE,
soc.org/doclib/20090720_DormineyEngage102.pdf (noting that in 2004 President Sarkozy, as part of his
constitutional reform efforts, commissioned a report to determine whether the Preamble to the French
Constitution should be revised to “permit . . . minorities to gain access to opportunities in education and
employment on a preferential basis” to combat social unrest and high crime “among minorities who are
disproportionately unemployed and undereducated”); see also France Backs Constitutional Reform,
BBC NEWS (Jul. 21, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7517505.stm (explaining that Sarkozy’s
constitutional reforms, which were one of his “key election pledges,” passed through Parliament).
279. Dorminey, supra note 278, at 43. The 1958 Preamble to the French Constitution, in relevant
part, states: “The French people solemnly proclaim their commitment to the Rights of Man and the
principles of national sovereignty as have been defined in the Declaration of 1789, confirmed
and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946 . . . .” 1958 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.).
280. See, e.g., Pascale Fréry, Simone Veil, FRANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Politics-Simone-Veil.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (explaining that
Ms. Veil, currently a member of France’s Constitutional Council, previously served as both President of
the European Parliament and as French Minister; Ms. Veil is also an Auschwitz survivor).
281. Dorminey, supra note 278, at 42-43.
282. Id.; COMITÉ DE RÉFLEXION SUR LE PRÉAMBULE DE LA CONSTITUTION, REDÉCOUVRIR LE
PRÉABULE DE LA CONSTITUTION: RAPPORT AU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (2008) (Fr.), available at
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000758/0000.pdf.
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other countries and the spirit and goals of the foundational documents of the French
nation, including the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 1958 French
Constitution, the committee concluded that amending the French Constitution to
facilitate the implementation of affirmative action policies would be counter to the
basic guiding laws and principles of the nation. 283 The committee concluded that
the 1958 Constitution, in its unmodified form, provides ample protection for the
“fundamental rights” articulated by the French nation. 284 Specifically, the Veil
Constitution Report states:
Overall, the committee did not recommend in the Preamble of the
Constitution the adoption of affirmative action measures founded on
ethnic or racial grounds regardless of whether they would be
conceived as temporary or not. This was not, in the committee’s
opinion, the meaning of the question it was asked to interpret in the
mission letter spelling out the assignment. It therefore did not
recommend that Article I of the Constitution which guarantees
“the equality of all citizens before the law without distinction as to
ethnic origin, race or religion,” be modified in such manner. 285

Other prominent French scholars, such as Patrick Weil, have also expressed
opposition to amending the Constitution in this regard, arguing that inserting
language permitting ethno-racial classifications recalls the days of slavery,
colonization, and the Vichy regime. 286 Patrick Weil reasons that the current
language of the French 1958 Constitution, which prohibits such distinctions, is
designed to ensure that similar atrocities against humanity do not happen again. 287
Another compelling argument against the use of ethno-racial criteria and the
collection of ethno-racial statistics in any form is offered by Dominique Sopo,
President of SOS Racisme, a prominent anti-discrimination group in France. 288
Sopo comments:
[T]he way in which identity has been constructed in France is very

283. Dorminey, supra note 278, at 43.
284. Id. at 43-44; ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 221.
285. COMITÉ DE RÉFLEXION SUR LE PRÉAMBULE DE LA CONSTITUTION, supra note 282, 44-45 (trans.
Kristen Barnes) (“Au total, le comité n’a donc pas recommandé d’autoriser, dans le Préambule de la
Constitution, des politiques d’action positive à fondement ethnique ou racial, fussent-elles conçues
comme provisoires. Tel n’était du reste pas, à ses yeux, le sens qu’il fallait prêter à la question qui lui
était posée dans la letter de mission qui lui était addressée. Il n’a donc pas proposé que soit modifié en
ce sens l’article 1er de la Constitution Assurant «l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans
distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion».”).
286. Interview with Patrick Weil, Entretien Avec Patrick Weil, Directeur de Recherche Au Cnrs «Il
faut passer à l’action au lieu de se contenter de symboles!», LE MONDE (Fr.), Dec. 18, 2008,
http://www.lemonde.fr/cgibin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J
&objet_id=1062848&xtmc=il_faut_passer_a_l_action_au_lieu_de_se_contenter_de_symboles&xtcr=1.
287. Id.
288. Interview with Dominique Sopo, supra note 56, at 1.
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different from what happened in the U.S. For example, the category
“black” would be very problematic in the French context, because in
this country an individual’s identity can be defined in many ways. To
take my own case, I could decide to classify myself as French, or as
black, or as métis (“mixed-race”), or as Togolese, or even FrenchTogolese. In France, if you invite people to classify themselves,
you’ll end up with dozens, if not hundreds, of different answers. So,
for ethno-racial categories to have any kind of utility, one would be
forced to consolidate these answers into a smaller number of labels.
But this would leave us with a statistical apparatus that wouldn’t
allow people to decide for themselves who they are, and which
eventually could harden into a normative, or even a prescriptive, set
of requirements. 289

Notwithstanding these objections, it is important to note some of the
benefits 290 that the French government could reap from officially recognizing
ethno-racial classifications. If ethno-racial categories are recognized, then accurate
statistics on majority and minority populations can be collected and a
comprehensive assessment of how various groups are faring in education,
employment, and in attaining access to other vital goods and services can be
undertaken, instead of leaving these tasks to guesswork. 291 While the concerns of
Weil, Sopo, and the Veil Commission should not be discounted, amending the
constitution to allow for ethno-racial classifications to be recognized in connection
with effectuating certain equalizing policies is not incongruous with France’s
foundational principle of equality. As long as such criteria are used in a careful,
sensitive, and monitored way, it could help to improve the lives of French citizens
and residents overall while remaining faithful to the paramount goal of equality.
Further, the concerns expressed by Sopo miss the point that regardless of whether
ethno-racial statistics are collected, people, historically, have formed opinions
about others, in France and the United States, when differences are detected based
upon numerous factors including phenotype features, religious practices, and
origins. This phenomenon has proven to be, in the history of both countries,
enormously detrimental to minorities. 292 Given that distinctions are made anyway,

289. Id.
290. Law professor Gwénaële Calvès challenges whether ethno-racial statistics would be used for
benign purposes. She maintains instead that businesses will seek to use the information to “demonstrate
that their workforce contains an ‘appropriate proportion’ of people from a given category” in the event
that they are charged with discrimination. Interview with Gwénaële Calvès, supra note 79, at 2. I
question whether this is a negative outcome. The fact that employers may be charged with ethno-racial
discrimination and their guilt or innocence may be established in part by the use of such statistics may
incentivize employers to be careful and fair in their hiring practices, to the extent they are not already
proceeding in this manner. Therefore, the statistics could work to curb ethno-racial discrimination in
hiring.
291. See Fouteau, supra note 62 (explaining that racial statistics are the only means of measuring the
effects of discrimination).
292. See, e.g., Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics, supra note 246, at 1 (noting that the
United States’ census includes race despite the country’s history of state-sanctioned racial
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why not have a formal mechanism in place to combat the harmful effects? In
France, where a substantial number of individuals who fall under the broad, nongovernment-endorsed categories of “African” and “Arab” live in the impoverished
outer cities that suffer from limited education opportunities and broad social
exclusion, 293 why not acknowledge that these groups are experiencing
disadvantages and design programs to assist them? The fact that ethno-racial
categories are acknowledged does not mean that individuals will no longer be able
to engage in the ongoing process of self-definition and identification; this is a
struggle that will continue to be waged, regardless of the system in place. 294 Rather
than getting inundated by endless micro-ethno-racial categories, broader categories
can serve the purpose of crafting equalizing educational and anti-discrimination
policies. 295
The implications of the Veil Constitution Report for expanding pro-equality
policies in the direction of ethno-racial minorities cannot be ignored. While the
commission’s conclusions may stall France’s progression towards the explicit use
of ethno-racial factors in fashioning equality of educational opportunity policies,
the question of how to reconcile France’s admirable grand concepts of liberty,
egality, and fraternity with the real circumstances of inequality that many French
African people are currently experiencing remains unanswered. Despite the
unwillingness of the Veil Commission to endorse an amendment to the 1958
Constitution to allow for distinctions to be drawn on the basis of ethno-racial
criteria in facilitation of affirmative action-like policies, the commission
nonetheless proposed that a statement regarding “the principle of the equal human
dignity of every individual” be included in Article I of the 1958 Constitution. 296
Perhaps this suggestion can be used as a starting point when the issue of the
appropriateness of ethno-racial factors and affirmative action policies in France is
revisited by constitutional law experts and government officials. It is clear that
given the virulence of current events, the issue will continue to resurface until more
broad-based national solutions to the country’s inequities are crafted.
The task of persuading a majority of the French populace and the appropriate

discrimination, whereas the French census does not include race due in part to the Vichy government’s
use of race to persecute Jews).
293. See, e.g., Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99 (explaining that France’s growing North African
immigrant population lives primarily in “drab” neighborhoods on the outskirts of Paris); Interview with
Dominique Sopo, supra note 56, at 1, 3, 4-5, 8 (noting the impact that culture has on French racism and
the exclusion of African immigrants from center city neighborhoods).
294. See Interview with Dominique Sopo, supra note 56, at 1-2 (considering the effect ethno-racial
categories would have on the self-identification of France’s minority citizens); Peter H. Schuck,
Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 14-16 (2002) (noting that
due to ongoing and inevitable racial integration, new demographics and identities are spreading, and will
continue to spread in the future).
295. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Against Individualized Consideration, 83 IND. L.J. 1405, 1407
(2008) (“[T]he broad, undifferentiated use of racial classifications better balances the interest in ensuring
the representation of disadvantaged or subordinated minority groups in public institutions and the
political process with the imperative of keeping the definition of race fluid.”).
296. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 221.
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government officials that amending the 1958 Constitution in the manner proposed
is daunting; nevertheless, it is worth noting that, historically, the French
Constitution of 1958 has undergone numerous amendments 297 and there is already a
process for amending this document outlined in Title XVI, Article 89 of the
Constitution. 298 The July 2008 amendments provide recent precedents for amending
the French Constitution. 299 Thus, it is possible for the French Republic to conclude
that a constitutional amendment to address the disparities in treatment of ethnoracial minorities is merited; however, it will take persistence, substantial
persuasion, and the recognition that the current limited programs undertaken by
certain institutions are insufficient. Persuasive support to facilitate this process of
moving towards amending the French Constitution can be found within French law
and within international law and the laws of the European Union, of which France
is a member.
In addition to Section 13 of the Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution,
which “guarantees equal access for children and adults to instruction, vocational
training and culture at all levels” and avers that the “provision of free, public, and
secular education at all levels is a duty of the state,” 300 proponents of a
constitutional amendment could also turn to the international law arena to bolster
their arguments that France must recognize ethno-racial criteria in order to achieve
the elusive goals of equal access and equality in education for African minorities
residing in France.
3. An Alternative Legal Basis for Affirmative Action Grounded in
International Law
While an in-depth consideration of how France’s legal regime and certain
European conventions and international treaties may figure into the development of
297. See id. at 34 (noting that the French Constitution of 1958 has been amended twenty-three times
between its creation in 1958 and February 2008 and that in July 2008, the Constitution was substantially
amended in order to conform to new developments, needs, ideas, and values in French society).
298. Title XVI, Article 89 of the 1958 French Constitution provides:
The President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and Members
of Parliament alike shall have the right to initiate amendments to the Constitution.
A Government or a Private Member’s Bill to amend the Constitution must be considered
within the time limits set down in the third paragraph of article 42 and be passed by the two
Houses in identical terms. The amendment shall take effect after approval by referendum.
However, a Government Bill to amend the Constitution shall not be submitted to
referendum where the President of the Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened
in Congress; the Government Bill to amend the Constitution shall then be approved only if
it is passed by a three-fifths majority of the votes cast. The Bureau of the Congress shall be
that of the National Assembly.
No amendment procedure shall be commenced or continued where the integrity of national
territory is placed in jeopardy.
The republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment.
1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.). Rogoff counts no less than twenty-three amendments to the 1958 French
Constitution from the moment of its adoption to the present. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 6.
299. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 85.
300. 1946 CONST. pmbl. § 13 (Fr.).
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France’s affirmative action and anti-discrimination policies is beyond the scope of
this article, the issue merits some attention. Within the international legal
framework there is support for the argument that the matter of amending the French
Constitution should be revisited to allow for the fashioning of broader national
solutions to the education and socio-economic disparities that plague African
minorities, along with certain other minority groups, 301 and that the necessary
changes can be accomplished without violating France’s fundamental principle of
equality.
The complex interplay between France’s laws, institutions, and procedures
and the international conventions, treaties, and courts to which France is subject
continues to be sorted out by the French government. 302 Notwithstanding this
ongoing process, because France is a member of the European Union and a
participant in the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”), 303 proponents for the use of ethno-race-based
affirmative action can resort to international law as an alternative source of support
for the arguments that (i) such classifications are necessary in order to design
policies that effectively assist that sector of the French population which seems to
be encountering substantial obstacles in the areas of educational attainment and
socio-economic advancement; and (ii) the use of such policies does not unduly
impinge on the ideal that all peoples should be treated equally and not subjected to
ethnic or racial discrimination. 304 In contrast to the prevailing interpretation of
French laws which deems any ethno-racial distinctions made in the context of
distributing governmental resources and benefits as constitutionally-prohibited
invidious racial discrimination, 305 ICERD defines “racial discrimination” as
“impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life.” 306 Under the legal rubric of ICERD,

301. Recent minority immigrant groups in France from the French Caribbean, Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Eastern Europe are also susceptible to suffering from the inequities noted. See HARGREAVES,
MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 72-74 (discussing the difficulties that immigrants from
Vietnam, Cambodia, and the French Caribbean face); see also Quinn Bennett, Please Don't Be Our
Guest: The Roma Expulsion from France Under European Union Law, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219,
226-27 (2011) (discussing the difficulties that immigrants from Eastern Europe face).
302. See ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 407 (“French judges have become more aware of and more
sensitive to the requirements of international law, and have made enormous progress in formulating
constitutional doctrine that is both responsive to the need to fulfill France’s international legal
obligations, while at the same time doing so with constitutional legitimacy.”).
303. ICERD, supra note 247; Costa-Lascoux, supra note 247, at 371.
304. Costa-Lascoux, supra note 247, at 372 (noting that France makes reference to ICERD in its
legislation and adopts its definitions).
305. Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics, supra note 246, at 1.
306. The full text of Part I, Article 1, Section 1 defines “racial discrimination”:
In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life.
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Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals
requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human
rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different
racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives
for which they were taken have been achieved. 307

Drawing inspiration and support from ICERD could be useful to the French
government in at least three respects. First, referencing ICERD, the French
government could formally recognize ethno-racial classifications which would
allow the government to assess the extent to which certain minority groups are not
receiving a quality education and have no meaningful track for acceptance into
institutions of higher education as compared to the majority population. Second,
policies could be specifically tailored to address the educational needs of those
underserved minority groups. Third, the rationale the French government offers for
adopting this track for responding to ethno-racial inequalities in education could be
couched in the language of ICERD to underscore that a refusal to adopt the type of
approach outlined results in a denial of the “equal enjoyment” and “exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms” to a significant part of the French
populace. That is, France’s resistance to adopting the more aggressive, explicit
avenue that ICERD allows effectively consigns a substantial number of African
French students to a life of poverty or severely impairs their economic
advancement. 308 To persist without change threatens France’s image as a nation
that prides itself as an exceptional example of fairness and equality.
An argument can also be made that to resist such ethno-race-based approaches
puts France out of step from a human rights standpoint. 309 Rather than being a
leader on this front, France is lagging behind the times with respect to the actual
opportunities for minorities, including African French people, to have decent
quality lives. The foregoing ICERD provision suggests that devising measures to
assist ethno-racial minorities who are socially, politically, and economically
marginalized is a legally permissible strategy from the standpoint of international
law and, because France has acceded to this Convention, from the perspective of

ICERD, supra note 247, at art. 1, ¶ 1.
307. Id. art. 1, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
308.See Guttenplan, supra note 107 (discussing the significant increase in wealth that
underprivileged minorities experienced after Sciences Po decided to relax its standards for eighty-five
secondary schools in underprivileged parts of France).
309. See John Rossant, Liberté, Égalité, Affirmative Action, BUS. WK., Jan. 30, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-01-30/liberte-egalite-affirmative-action
(arguing
that
affirmative action is necessary in France in order to ameliorate the unemployment and poverty in the
suburbs that are home to many French citizens of North African origin).
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French legal principles as well. 310 There is even a basis, within French
constitutional law, for addressing complaints that adopting policies to satisfy
France’s obligations under ICERD would be in conflict with French laws. French
constitutional law scholar Martin Rogoff comments that Article 55 of the French
Constitution, 311 under certain circumstances, supports the position that in matters of
conflict between a French law and international treaties and conventions, the
international convention should trump. 312 Finally, the language of ICERD indicates
that it is aimed at promoting the aggressive undertaking of affirmative action
policies that will assist in eradicating, inter alia, unequal (educational)
opportunities that are suffered by ethno-racial minorities. 313
IV. EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN TEXAS AND THE CURRENT U.S.
LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. What a Difference a Day Makes: Grutter, Gratz, and the Ten Percent Plan
In Section II, I highlighted the cases Brown, 314 Bakke, 315 and Hopwood, 316 as
the historical legal precedents that laid the foundation for the Texas Ten Percent
Plan. Since the plan’s implementation in 1998, U.S. educational equality law has
experienced some tumultuous shifts and remains contested. 317 Fierce debates
continue to be waged over the best methods to address historic inequalities that
certain minorities have experienced, 318 and continue to experience, within this
country while also remaining faithful to the idea that all citizens are equal before
the law. 319 The legal changes have a critical impact on the ways in which the plan

310. ICERD, supra note 247, art. 1, ¶ 4.
311. “Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over
Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other
party.” 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.).
312. See ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 224. (“Treaties and international agreements . . . can be applied
by the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, and in case of conflict with a law or administrative
act, the international obligation, by virtue of article 55 of the constitution, will take priority.”).
313. See ICERD, supra note 247, art. 7 (“States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective
measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to
combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination . . . .” (emphasis added)).
314. 347 U.S. 483.
315. 438 U.S. 265.
316. 78 F.3d 932.
317. See Ronald Caldwell Jr., The Erosion of Affirmative Action and Its Consequences for the BlackWhite Educational Attainment Gap, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 813, 818 (2009) (discussing the various laws
that were passed in multiple states regarding affirmative action in education contemporaneously to the
Texas Ten Percent Plan).
318. Id. at 813 (noting that the “disparity in economic outcomes between whites and blacks in the
United States has long been an important social and political issue” and that the “use of affirmative
action in university admissions has now endured more than a decade of legal, political, and social
challenges and will likely remain a topic of significant debate in the near future”).
319. The Declaration of Independence of 1776, a cornerstone U.S. history proclaims, “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (1776).
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can be reformed and expanded in the interests of attaining equality in educational
opportunities for underrepresented minorities. The proposed modifications to the
Ten Percent Law relate to my first and second theses, that race and ethnicity still
matter, requiring academic institutions and policy makers to continue to take these
factors into account when formulating equality policies. At the forefront of the shift
in U.S. equality jurisprudence is the U.S. Supreme Court decision Grutter v.
Bollinger, 320 which redefined the education equality law landscape. 321
The Grutter decision marked the U.S. Supreme Court’s return to the question
whether the use of ethno-racial criteria by public universities in admissions
decisions is constitutionally permissible, after nearly twenty-six years of silence
following the Bakke case. 322 A white female resident of Michigan, named Barbara
Grutter, in 1996 brought the case after she applied to the University of Michigan
Law School (“UM Law School”), was placed on a waiting list, and eventually was
denied admission. In the following year, Ms. Grutter filed suit against the UM Law
School, the Regents of the University of Michigan, and school officials responsible
for overseeing the admissions process, alleging that those named in the suit
discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 323 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 324 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 325
As relief, Grutter sought compensatory and punitive damages, an order directing
the UM Law School to grant her admission, and an injunction to prohibit the law
school from continuing to engage in racially discriminatory practices. 326 The policy
challenged in Grutter entails the selection of students based upon a range of factors
including LSAT score, grade point average, essays, letters of recommendation,

320. 539 U.S. 306.
321. Id. at 337-44 (holding that a “highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file,
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational
environment” and not based on race alone was within constitutionally prescribed limits for the
admissions process of a post-secondary educational institution); see also Fisher, 631 F.3d at 249-51
(Garza, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court [in Grutter] redefined the meaning of narrow tailoring. . . . And
thus, all that truly remains of strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring inquiry post-Grutter is the requirement of
‘individualized consideration.’”).
322. See Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
437, 446 (2011) (noting that during the twenty-five years between Bakke and Grutter, the Supreme
Court had many opportunities to introduce diversity as a compelling state interest, but declined to do so).
323. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 2.
324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
325. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. The framing of Ms. Grutter’s suit is exemplary of lawsuits involving
equal educational opportunity issues. As an interesting aside, both the intended beneficiaries of these
laws, from the vantage point of the legislative histories, and complainants who seek to dismantle
affirmative action have relied upon the aforementioned laws in stating their claims. See, e.g., Gratz, 539
U.S. at 270 (holding that the university’s policy utilizing ethno-racial criteria was not narrowly tailored
and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a)); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (holding that the failure of the school
district to provide remedial language instruction to non-English speaking Chinese students violated Title
VI).
326. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.
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undergraduate courses taken, and life experience. 327 The UM Law School also
includes, as part of its admissions policy, a focus on attaining and maintaining a
diverse student body with special emphasis on individuals from groups that have
been historically marginalized such as African Americans, Latinos, and Native
Americans. 328
Grutter resolves opposing views of the lower courts regarding whether Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, that assembling a diverse student population constitutes
a sufficiently compelling interest to withstand strict scrutiny, 329 and that race and
ethnicity may be included as factors for consideration in administering a school’s
admissions policy, 330 is binding precedent. 331 The Grutter Court answered in the
affirmative holding that (1) “student body diversity is a compelling state interest
that can justify the use of race in university admissions” 332 and (2) the UM Law
School’s use of ethnicity and race in its admissions policy was not precluded by the
Equal Protection Clause because it was “narrowly tailored” to the school’s
“compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body.” 333 The Grutter holding had direct and substantial implications for
school administrators and the Texas Ten Percent Plan because it overruled
Hopwood and cleared the way for race and ethnicity to once again be considered by
public colleges and universities in Texas in formulating their student admissions
schemes. 334 The Grutter holding offered desperately needed maneuverability to
school administrators, judging from the limitations that they were encountering in
having to rely solely upon the percentage strategy to accomplish ethno-racial access
and diversity in their student populations. Evidence of the limited effectiveness of
the Ten Percent strategy is provided, in part, by the comments voiced by the Plan’s
administrators, who observed that the plan does not result in a sufficient number of
admissions of underrepresented minorities if one takes into account the ethno-racial
make-up of the state. 335 Patricia Ohlendorf, Vice President for Legal Affairs at UT
Austin has expressed concern that the surrogate Ten Percent approach is inadequate
327. Id. at 315.
328. Id. at 316.
329. In a section of the opinion that was not joined by a majority of the Court, Justice Powell
concluded that “the attainment of a diverse student body” is “clearly a constitutionally permissible goal
for an institution of higher education.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.).
330. Id. at 320.
331. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (“Justice Powell’s view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this
issue.”); cf. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating,
without mentioning Bakke, that diversity cannot “be elevated to the ‘compelling’ level”).
332. 539 U.S. at 325. Justices O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were the majority
upholding the UM Law School’s ethno-race-conscious admissions policy. Id. at 343-44. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissented from the majority decision. Id at 379
(dissenting opinion).
333. Id. at 343.
334. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and
Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2007) (noting that due to the holdings in Grutter and Gratz, public
college and universities are now free to consider race and ethnicity in their admissions process).
335. See Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 247 (discussing that when taking into account the
racial make-up of Texas, the Texas Plan fails to admit enough underrepresented minorities).
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to satisfy the important objective of providing significant educational opportunities
to a multi-ethnic community, particularly in view of the growing Latino
population. 336 Ohlendorf observed, “We [at UT Austin] have not found that the
top-10-percent law and policy in and of itself have been sufficient to achieve a
critical mass of minority students.” 337
Comments about the potential resulting shortfalls of Texas’ Plan did not fall
on deaf ears. Empowered by Grutter, the University of Texas Board of Regents, by
an August 6, 2003 resolution, invited each university in the Texas school system to
review whether ethno-racial factors should be reintroduced and considered as part
of the admissions process. 338 Relying upon Grutter as a roadmap, the Board of
Regents cautioned that taking into account such criteria must be done in a “holistic”
way conforming to the type of review advocated in Grutter. 339 Following each
school’s independent assessment of whether ethnic and race-based information
should be incorporated back into the admissions decisions, the Texas Board of
Regents opined in August 2004 that race and ethnicity could be considered as a
“special circumstance” in determining the personal achievement score of a high
school applicant. 340
Taking its cue from the Board of Regents decision, in 2004, UT Austin
announced its intention to address the constraints of the plan by fashioning an
ethno-race-conscious admissions approach, based upon the admissions policy
scrutinized and held constitutional in Grutter, to operate in tandem with the Ten
Percent Plan. 341 UT Austin outlined its plan in the document, Proposal to Consider
Race and Ethnicity in Admissions (“UT 2004 Proposal”). 342 Under this plan, UT
Austin kept in place, for Texas residents, its policy of first granting automatic
admission to those individuals meeting the criteria of the Ten Percent Law. For the
remaining slots carved out for Texas residents, those students who do not qualify
for automatic admission under the Ten Percent Law are granted admission based
upon their Academic Index (“AI”) and Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”). 343
336. Mangan, supra note 218.
337. Id. (emphasis added). The concept of “critical mass” is an important one that will continue to
arise in the debates regarding equal education. Justice O’Connor, in Grutter, distinguished a quota from
the critical mass concept emphasizing that the first is too rigid in that it requires that a fixed number be
met. 539 U.S. at 325.
338. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 594.
341. See James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher: A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 57, 58-59 (2012) (“In 2004, the University of Texas reintroduced the consideration of race into
the admissions process as a means of increasing student body diversity.”).
342. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
343. The AI is “a computation based on the student’s high school class rank, standardized test scores,
and the extent to which the applicant exceeded UT’s required high school curriculum.” Fisher, 631 F.3d
at 222. The PAI is composed of three scores. Two separate scores are awarded for the two mandatory
essays, and a “personal achievement score” which is based on the complete file of the applicant. Id. at
227-28. The personal achievement score is based on admissions officials’ “assess[ment] [of] an
applicant’s demonstrated leadership qualities, awards, and honors, work experience, and involvement in
extracurricular activities . . . [and] a ‘special circumstances’ element that may reflect the socioeconomic

Fall 2012]

RIDING INTO THE SUNSET IN A “POST-RACIAL” WORLD

157

Whereas ethnicity and race previously were not included as items for consideration,
UT Austin modified its permissible criteria to allow race and ethnicity factors to be
weighed as part of a student’s PAI. UT Austin’s addition of ethno-race-based
criteria to the admissions decisions process yielded notable increases in Latino and
African American enrollment. At the time the 2004 proposal was issued, African
Americans comprised 4.5% of the first year class and Latinos constituted 16.9% 344
of a total entering class of approximately 7000 students. 345 With the addition of the
ethno-racial components into UT Austin’s admissions decisions, the percentage of
Latino students in the first year class advanced to 20% and the percentage of
African American students climbed to 6%. 346 The Texas Board of Regent’s
decision to allow the reintegration of ethnicity and race into college admissions
procedures suggests that a successful strategy to include historically excluded
ethno-racial minorities must expressly account for those factors which were the
basis of their prior exclusion (that is, race and ethnicity). The Texas results also
indicate that a battery of inclusion strategies may be necessary to attain the elusive
ideal of equality of educational opportunity. UT Austin’s hybrid plan of attack
strikes the right balance by combining the percentage plan, which works to some
extent, with the use of ethno-racial criteria to address the shortfalls of minority
admissions under the plan.
Grutter is not only significant because of what it permits schools to consider
in rendering their admissions decisions, but also because it helps to delineate the
constitutionally-acceptable boundaries within which a school may operate
according to its admissions procedures. 347 The Texas Board of Regents and UT
Austin took note of these boundaries when re-incorporating ethnic and racial
elements back into the admissions process. 348 UT Austin’s attentiveness to this
aspect of Grutter proved useful to it in terms of withstanding a challenge to its
revised policies in 2009. 349 The Grutter Court accomplished the feat of outlining
the appropriate contours for an admissions policy by giving substantial attention to

status of the applicant and his or her high school, the applicant’s family status and family
responsibilities, the applicant’s standardized test score compared to the average of her high school, and
beginning in 2004–the applicant’s race.” Id. at 228 (emphasis added). Allowing race to be factored into
an applicant’s PAI represents the significant change to the AI/PAI system, which was in place as early
as 1997. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596. Other permissible factors in the “special circumstances”
consideration include “whether [the applicant] lives in a single-parent home, whether languages other
than English are spoken at home, [and] her SAT/ACT score compared to her school’s average score.”
Id. (citing IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW, supra note
213, at 2).
344. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 244. Some sources report the figure of 16.3% for the Latino population in
2004. Hough, supra note 205, at 214.
345. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
346. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
347. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-28, 334 (holding that a university’s race-based admissions
decisions were constitutional as they were narrowly tailored and necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest in achieving educational benefits from a diverse student body).
348. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225.
349. Id. at 247.
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the legal standard it applied to review UM Law School’s admissions scheme. 350
The Court adopted strict scrutiny as the legal standard of review in accordance with
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 351 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 352 and
Bakke. 353 The strict scrutiny standard requires that any ethnic or racial
classifications imposed by federal, state or local government be “narrowly tailored”
and “further compelling governmental interests” in order to be held
constitutional. 354
Grutter demonstrates that a school can consider ethnicity and race without
being found to have acted counter to the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment 355 and the equality guarantees of Title VI 356 and Section
1981(a). 357 The ability to take ethno-racial criteria into account even though there
are laws in place that guarantee equal treatment exemplifies the tension Justice
Harry Blackmun identifies in the epigraph to this article. 358 While the Grutter case
is positive in the sense that it supports the use of a variety of strategies in the name
of equal educational opportunity, it still plays into the hands of the proxy strategy

350. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-28 (discussing its application of strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications imposed by the government and examining UM Law School’s stated compelling
government interest to obtain educational benefits from a diverse student body).
351. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (“The purpose of the
narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that the means chosen fit th[e] compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
352. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (plurality opinion); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“[W]e adhere to
Adarand’s teaching that the very purpose of strict scrutiny is to take . . . ‘relevant differences into
account.’” (citations omitted)).
353. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program
cannot use a quota system—it cannot insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired
qualifications from competition with all other applicants. . . . Instead, a university may consider race or
ethnicity only as a plus in a particular applicant’s file, without insulat[ing] the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.” (alterations in original) (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 315-317) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
354. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
355. 539 U.S. at 343. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized
in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
356. 539 U.S. at 343; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”).
357. 539 U.S. at 343; see 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”).
358. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion) (“If [affirmative action] conflicts
with idealistic equality, that tension is original Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitutionally
conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it is part of the Amendment’s very nature until complete
equality is achieved in the area.”).
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approach in that it obscures ethnicity and race by enfolding it within the notion of a
“holistic” view. 359 That is, schools can rely on ethno-racial criteria, as part of their
admissions decision-making as long as they also consider a host of other factors
such as high school region, language ability, athletic ability, etc. Encapsulating
ethnicity and race in this way is perhaps necessary given a conservative political
environment that is resistant to any policies which suggest that certain minorities
are benefiting from preferences to the detriment of “innocent” non-minority
candidates. 360 But, this maneuver also limits how far government and institutions
can go with attempting to equalize educational opportunities for underrepresented
minorities. 361 Applying Grutter’s guidelines to its institution, UT Austin
administrators also shielded ethnicity and race behind a phalanx of items under the
PAI that may be considered for admitting students. 362
In reformulating its admissions components, UT Austin also had to take into
account the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, Gratz v. Bollinger, 363 which was issued
in conjunction with Grutter. 364 Gratz explained how much latitude public
universities have in fashioning policies designed to address the vestiges of past
discrimination and to stem the ongoing impact of disparities and discriminatory
practices. It is clear from the Gratz holding, which struck down UM’s ethno-race
inflected admissions policy, that under the current U.S. legal regime, the freedom
public post-secondary institutions have to attend to these issues is severely
restricted. 365 Gratz involved UM’s use of ethno-racial factors in its admissions

359. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (characterizing UM’s admissions program as a “highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”). See generally Sabbagh, Affirmative
Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 7 (explaining the nature of a proxy strategy).
360. The Grutter Court made the determination that UM Law School’s race-conscious policy does
not “unduly harm nonminority applicants” and placed substantial weight on the fact that “[t]he Law
School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than
underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are rejected.” Grutter, 539
U.S. at 338, 341. Legal scholar Derrick Bell has commented extensively on this practice of restricting
affirmative action policies to the extent that they will harm the majority white population. See BELL,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 209 (“[O]pponents [of minority admissions
plans] resist any policy that appears to require that whites pay or even risk paying for racial wrongs that
they did not themselves commit.”); id. at 126 (“The admissions program upheld in Grutter is one
example of a race-based measure that furthers racial justice without unduly interfering with nonminority
expectations.”).
361. See BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 120 (“[N]arrow tailoring
requires that any race-based classification be limited in time, necessary to achieve the desired goal, and
minimally burdensome to innocent nonminorities.”).
362. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227-28.
363. 539 U.S. 244.
364. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 235 & n.121 (explaining how the UT Austin administration knew that a
quota system of establishing a specific number would not survive judicial review in consideration of
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268, 271-72, which held that a university may not award a fixed number of bonus
points to minority applicants in admissions decisions).
365. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72 (finding UM’s admissions policy problematic because it
automatically distributes twenty points to every applicant from an underrepresented minority group and
lacks an individualized consideration that “has the effect of making ‘the factor of race . . . decisive’ for
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procedures for the undergraduate program in the College of Literature and Arts. 366
UM, in administering its program, considered a variety of factors including, inter
alia, test scores, grades, high school curriculum, alumni connections, quality of
high school attended, personal essays, in-state residency, race, and ethnicity. 367
Regarding the latter two factors, UM identified Native Americans, African
Americans, and Latinos as underrepresented minorities in their student population
and sought to increase the representation of individuals from these groups. 368
Accordingly, UM awarded students points based upon the multi-layered criteria
identified above. 369 The Court chose to focus on the aspect of UM’s approach that
awarded twenty points to applicants who are members of the underrepresented
minority groups and concluded that:
[T]he University’s policy, which automatically distributes 20 points,
or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every
single “underrepresented minority” applicant solely because of race,
is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational
diversity that respondents claim justifies their program. 370

Based upon its determination that UM’s admissions scheme did not meet the
strict scrutiny requirement of narrow tailoring, the Court held that the policy was
unconstitutional in that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 371 Bearing in mind the parameters that
Gratz defined, UT Austin, in refactoring racial and ethnic elements back into its
admissions calculus, was careful not to quantify how these elements would be
evaluated (for example, by awarding a specific number of “points” for race or
ethnicity). Instead, UT Austin nestles ethnicity and race among other “special
circumstance” elements and encases them within the constitutionally-approved
holistic approach of the PAI. 372

B. Reintroducing Race and Ethnicity Criteria: The Fisher Case
UT Austin’s decision to re-infuse ethnicity and race into the school’s
admissions considerations incited some controversy and gave rise to the case

virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at
317)).
366. Id. at 265.
367. Id. at 255.
368. Id. at 253-54.
369. Id. at 255.
370. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
371. Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer constituted the majority to
hold UM’s admissions policy unconstitutional. Id. at 275-76. Justices Stevens, id. at 282-91 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Souter, id. at 291-98 (Souter, J., dissenting), and Ginsburg, id. at 298-305 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), all filed dissenting opinions.
372. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596-98.
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Fisher v. University of Texas. 373 The immediate critical importance of the Fisher
case in the U.S. affirmative action debate cannot be overemphasized, especially
because a final decision on the case, which was argued before the Court in October
2012, is anticipated in the coming year. 374 In Fisher, two white Texas residents
filed the initial lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
against UT Austin and other school officials after the school denied them
admission for the 2008 school year. 375 The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that
UT Austin is precluded from re-introducing ethnicity and race criteria into its
admission process given that it already has in place a strategy that does not rely on
these criteria (that is, the Ten Percent Plan) yet achieves a diverse student
population. In other words, UT Austin may not simultaneously pursue two different
strategies to accomplish ethno-racial diversity, and, further, where a non-ethnorace-based strategy exists, the university’s reliance upon such factors is not
constitutionally permissible. 376 Specifically, the Fisher plaintiffs argued that:
UT’s decision to reintroduce the use of race-conscious admissions
was unconstitutional because minority enrollment already met or
exceeded “critical mass” when this decision was made, and thus any
further facial consideration of race was neither warranted nor
constitutional. 377

Despite the plaintiffs’ argument, there is no numeric value attached to the
definition of “critical mass” 378 and thus, as a preliminary matter, their attempt to
posit what constitutes that threshold does not have a basis in equal education
jurisprudence. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, the District Court held that,
“Nothing in Grutter prohibits a university from using both race-neutral alternatives
and race itself.” 379 Concluding that “[a] university presenting itself as open to all
may be challenged when the state’s minority population grows steadily but
minority enrollment does not,” 380 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of
UT Austin’s admissions program. 381
The controversy in Fisher demonstrates the necessity of keeping the goals of
inclusion and diversity transparent in admissions processes, even when the
processes rely on non-race-based strategies and ethno-racial proxies. This clarity is

373. 631 F.3d at 213.
374. 132 S. Ct. 1536, No. 11-345 (argued Oct. 10, 2012).
375. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
376. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242-43.
377. Id. at 242.
378. Id. at 235.
379. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (emphasis added).
380. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 237.
381. Id. at 246-47. The recent Fisher decision was rendered by a federal appeals court consisting of a
three-judge panel, which was composed of Judge Patrick Higginbotham, the author of the opinion,
Judge Carolyn Dineen King, and Judge Emilio M. Garza. In a nine to seven vote, the judges of the U.S.
Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit declined to grant a rehearing of the Fisher case before the full Fifth
Circuit.
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necessary so that, if the proxy approach is deemed inadequate by school officials,
for example, an appropriate adjustment can be made, including one that allows for
the express consideration of ethno-racial criteria. UT Austin’s move to
reincorporate an ethno-race-conscious policy into its admissions decisions indicates
that proxy strategies, such as percentage plans, are insufficient to achieve the goals
of equal access and ethno-racial diversity.
However, while current proxy plans may have limited potential to produce a
critical mass of minority students, this limitation derives from the specific
application of the plans. Proxies may not be inherently inferior. That is, a substitute
approach could be crafted combining a number of factors as proxies (for example,
low economic status, attendance at poorly performing schools of limited economic
resources, and residence in economically-challenged neighborhoods) that
disproportionately impact underrepresented minority students. 382 This “superproxy” could result in a significant increase in the percentage of minority students
admitted to post-secondary schools. However, there would likely be a public outcry
over the adoption of a super-proxy. A mechanism particularized in this manner that
yields a substantial increase in minority admissions would lose its claim to being
racially “neutral” and would be subject to constitutional challenge. Opponents
would likely argue that the super-proxy is a mere pretext for making ethno-raceconscious decisions. Political climate limits how far schools may go with
developing a proxy for admissions programs. 383 When one encounters the limits of
proxy strategies, there may be a need to take ethno-racial factors into account. If
one has been clear about which outcomes are important, then it strengthens the
response to legal challenges. My thesis is in accord with the guidelines recently
issued by the Office of Civil Rights for the U.S. Department of Education and the
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, which assert that “[i]n
some cases, race-neutral approaches will be unworkable because they will be
ineffective to achieve the diversity the institution seeks.” 384
V. OVERALL COMPARISON OF THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
TEXAS TEN PERCENT PLAN AND THE SCIENCES PO’S CEP PLAN
A. Similarities Between the Texas and the Sciences Po Strategies
The proxy approaches implemented in the United States and France share
similar goals regarding diversity. Like the Sciences Po’s CEP program, the Texas

382. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY IN POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION 7 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-pse201111.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE] (“An institution could consider
an applicant’s socioeconomic status, first-generation college status, geographic residency, or other raceneutral criteria if doing so would assist in drawing students from different racial backgrounds to the
institution.”).
383. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 211.
384. GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE, supra note 382, at 6.
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Plan relies upon factors other than race and ethnicity to categorize and select
students. 385 Also, like the French program, the Texas Plan relies upon the secondary
factor of ethno-racial high school demographics and housing so that its program
can be cast as facially race-neutral. 386 Both plans were introduced into challenging
legal environments that ostensibly precluded explicit references to and reliance
upon ethno-racial criteria. 387
Another similarity that both plans share is the shortcoming that the way in
which the schemes are structured means they are inadequate proxies to fully
capture sufficient numbers of underrepresented ethno-racial students. 388 Just as
there are talented Texas students from the underrepresented pool who fall within
the second and third deciles and, thus, do not qualify for automatic admission under
the Top Ten Percent Law, there are talented underrepresented minority French
students who do not live within the favored zones but may, nonetheless, encounter
exclusion or discrimination which impairs their ability to advance within France’s
education system and ultimately, to acquire gainful and prestigious employment.
B. Differences Between the Texas and Sciences Po Strategies
There are also some important differences between the CEP scheme and
Texas’ Plan. First, as distinguished from the French plan, the Texas Plan does not
have to de-emphasize ethnicity and race to the same degree as the French program
in order to be deemed constitutionally valid because, under Grutter, race may be
considered as one factor among many to achieve the compelling goal of
diversifying a school’s student population. 389 For political reasons, the ethno-racial
goals are not always highlighted, but Texas schools are permitted, under the U.S.
Constitution, to articulate and pursue the goals of equal access and diversity in
education. 390 Indeed, as expressed in the amicus brief filed by the United States in
Grutter, the goal of “[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all
segments of American society, including people of all races and ethnicities,
represents a paramount government objective.” 391 The Sciences Po, in contrast,
strategically chooses not to emphasize the ethno-racial diversity goals of its CEP
program so as not to run afoul of the constitutional prohibition of not making
distinctions as to “origin, race or religion.” 392
Second, as previously discussed, the CEP program is more limited in focus in
that it does not apply to the whole of France or even to the entire center of Paris

385. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 228.
386. Id. at 228-29.
387. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 264.
388. See id. at 253 (“[T]hese programs help to protect White privilege by providing a limited
pathway that allows a few non-Whites to succeed in what continue to be racially hostile
environments.”).
389. 539 U.S. at 334.
390. Id. at 343.
391. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635 at *13.
392. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.).
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and its adjacent outlying regions and is confined to the admissions of one
university. 393 This reach is in contrast to the Texas plan, which applies to the entire
State of Texas and all of the state’s public post-secondary education institutions. 394
A third difference is that, while the Texas Plan stipulates that a certain
percentage of high school students are qualified to be admitted to a Texas college
or university of their choice, there is no agreed upon percentage of top students
from each high school that is granted admission under the French plan. Rather, the
Sciences Po has substantial discretion in selecting who will be admitted under the
CEP program and the number of students. 395 The Texas schools had to lobby to
reintroduce discretion back into their admissions process. 396
Fourth, under the CEP plan, students are very clearly subjected to a different
set of admissions criteria than the students living outside of the designated zones
who are admitted under the regular admissions process. Most notably, the CEP
students do not have to take the concours. 397 One potential way that the CEP
program can eliminate this glaring difference in admissions criteria is to require the
CEP students to take the concours as part of their application requirements. This
change would mean that the students would need to undertake the rigorous twoyear preparatory course to sit for the concours. 398 The Sciences Po administrators
could set a different minimum score level threshold for the CEP students, so that
they would not be barred from admission based upon their test scores, or they could
disregard the scores altogether but at least they would have a record of them.
Adding this component to their application requirements would help, in
appearance, to equalize the application process for all French students. Also, adding
the test requirement would allow the Sciences Po to keep track of test performance
levels of students from the CEP regions over time as a way to track whether the
effects of the program are positively impacting curriculum, quality of teaching, and
the test taking abilities of the students. Comparing the selection criteria of the
Sciences Po to that of Texas, while the Ten Percent Plan is neutral on its face, in
that all admitted students must meet the criteria stipulated by the Ten Percent
Law, 399 there remain differences in the particular courses of study Texas high
school students may follow and in the quality of the various high schools they
attend. The main equalizing factors are that for the top ten percent students, the
standardized test scores (namely, SAT or ACT scores) are disregarded and class
rank is decisive. 400
Fifth, the CEP students are only competing amongst themselves for the

393. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 262-63.
394. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56.
395. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 263.
396. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224-26.
397. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 263 (describing the concours as “rigorous competitive entrance
exams”).
398. Id.
399. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
400. Id. at 241.
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separate admission slots created by the Sciences Po. 401 It is clear that a special track
of entry has been created for them that is not available to France’s general student
population who reside outside of the targeted regions. 402 In some respects, the
special track is like the one that was held unconstitutional in Bakke. 403 The
difference in admissions criteria and the isolation of the review of CEP candidates
from other candidates for admission may raise questions in terms of evaluating the
Sciences Po’s plan from the constitutional perspective of the United States, 404 even
though the ethno-racial impact is not offered as the primary purpose of the plan and
race and ethnicity are not the declared factors determining admission. In contrast to
the Sciences Po’s scheme, the Texas Plan allows all graduating Texas resident high
school students to compete for the Texas resident top ten percent slots. 405 In this
respect, it differs from the Sciences Po program; however, in terms of the entire
pool of applicants to UT Austin, for example, applicants are placed within groups
and individuals within those discrete groups compete amongst themselves for
available spaces. 406
VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE: THE FUTURE OF PROXY
STRATEGIES AND DIVERSITY IN EDUCATION
There are lessons the United States and France can glean from one another in
examining the initiatives both nations have instituted in the pursuit of ways to
achieve and maintain ethno-racial diversity in their respective institutions of higher
learning. Regarding this discussion of the lessons for France and the United States,
I appreciate that there may be resistance to the idea of looking to other jurisdictions
401. While the Sciences Po’s strategy of increasing class size to accommodate the CEP students
worked well at its institution to help dampen the potential outcry that CEP students were taking
admission seats away from more qualified candidates, for the U.S., expanding class sizes to
accommodate a disenfranchised student population may not be economically feasible to the extent that
there may be a need for budget-constrained schools to increase financial packages for certain students.
Increasing student admissions also may not be desirable, in terms of classroom learning experiences and
maintaining reasonable student to teacher ratios. It is unlikely that U.S. courts would accept the Sciences
Po’s characterization to view the newly created seats as admissions slots that students outside of the
Sciences Po’s targeted zones were never allowed to compete for, because they didn’t exist prior to the
advent of the CEP program, and never would be allowed to compete for if the program ended. A more
probable outcome is that U.S. courts would view all the admissions places, including the new slots, as
the entire pool of admission seats that all students should be able to compete for without any restrictions.
402. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 5-6.
403. See id. (noting that the special track policy of focusing on geography is similarly systematic to
programs which focus on race).
404. According to the Grutter Court, universities implementing race-conscious programs “cannot
establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups
on
separate
admission tracks. . . . Nor can universities insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic
groups from the competition for admission.” 539 U.S. at 334 (internal citations omitted).
405. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803.
406. The district court in Fisher noted: “Before their candidacies are evaluated, all applicants to UT
are divided into three pools: Texas residents, domestic non-Texas residents and international students. . .
. Students compete only against other students in their respective pools for admission.” 645 F. Supp. 2d
at 595 (internal citations omitted).
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for solutions to address the issues of social integration and fuller inclusion of ethnoracial minorities. 407 I am not advocating the wholesale adoption of
antidiscrimination and pro-equality strategies developed in one nation by another
nation. I know and expect that even though a policy developed in France could be
potentially effective if adopted by the United States, the policy will be
deconstructed and reformulated, as necessary, to take into account the
particularities of a country and to fit the contours of the social and juridical
landscape. In this section, my goal is to draw some conclusions regarding the
potential sharing of strategies to tackle issues that are germane to both the United
States and France.
A. What the Sciences Po’s Approach to Affirmative Action Can Teach the United
States
One of the most compelling aspects of the Sciences Po’s plan and, more
broadly, France’s equality project, is the challenge to try to think outside of ethnoracial classifications. France offers a testing ground for this approach. France’s
form of affirmative action, via the Sciences Po, provides the United States with an
opportunity to monitor the results that can be achieved when a modern Western
society holds steadfast to the position that ethno-racial categories will not be
formally acknowledged or relied upon in designing affirmative action policies. The
Sciences Po’s approach reflects France’s postulate that an equal, non-race-based
society should not codify the language of ethnic-racial difference in that society’s
socio-economic policies. Accordingly, policymakers who seek to address racial
disparity should not have to worry about finding ways to excise ethno-racial
language from the laws once ethnic-racial balance is achieved and discrimination is
eradicated. In such a paradigm, it will be unnecessary to address the sunset
provision issue that arises in the United States. If applied in the United States, such
a policy’s lack of explicit reference to race would obviate the need to assess
whether the policy has a clearly delineated durational endpoint. 408 Further, there
would not be tension between the proposed affirmative action policy and
constitutional language which requires, for example, the “equality of all citizens
before the law, without distinction of origin, race, or religion” 409 or that “[n]o state

407. Legal scholar Gwénaële Calvès’ words are exemplary of this resistance:
We can’t simply import a technique or method we’ve come across in another country and,
with the help of this “magic wand,” solve the problem of discrimination in our own country.
To imagine that we can is to depoliticize the issue. Discrimination tells us something about
the society from which it has arisen; and French society is not American society. Can we
really abstract from the fundamental differences—historical, political, economic, and social
differences—between France and the U.S. and transfer this or that technique, considered in
isolation? I do not think so, and so I reiterate my assessment of a decade ago: there is
nothing that France can learn from the U.S. as far as antidiscrimination is concerned.
Interview with Gwénaële Calvès, supra note 79. While I share Professor Calvès’ concerns and recognize
the need to evaluate the initiatives proposed, I disagree with her conclusion.
408. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
409. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.).
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shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” 410
The Sciences Po’s CEP approach also suggests that focusing on economic
class or geographic location, given the prevailing ethno-racial segregation in
housing, are more useful markers, than ethnicity or race, of socio-economic
disparities; therefore, a program could rely upon these factors and still be effective
without offending the principle of equality. 411 Some parallels may be drawn
between the ethno-racial housing segregation in the United States and France. In
both countries, where one lives can significantly impact one’s access to quality
schools, jobs, and other precious resources. 412 So, to the extent that a plan can be
designed to counteract the concomitant negative aspects of locale, such a plan
should be encouraged. The Texas Plan already appropriates the (negative) fact of
segregation for the positive purpose of increasing ethno-racial minority admissions
to post-secondary schools. 413 While percentage plans may not work in all regions of
the United States, some consideration should be given to expanding this geographic
approach if it would help to achieve the goals of eliminating disparities in the
quality of education and access to education opportunities for underrepresented
ethno-racial minorities. Regarding using economic class as a proxy, France’s
emphasis on this factor converges with the rising sentiment in some U.S. quarters
that Americans find class preferences more acceptable than ethno-racial ones 414 and
thus, schemes designed to target students who suffer economic disadvantages are
less likely to provoke constitutional challenges. Further, because there is a
disturbing degree of overlap between economic status and the underrepresented

410. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
411. Adopting the approach of concentrating on other factors (e.g., housing demographics) holds
some promise for success and is in keeping with the views expressed by Justice Kennedy in his
concurring opinion in Parents Involved, wherein he suggested that school boards could “draw[]
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods” as an alternative,
constitutionally-permissible strategy for achieving ethno-racial diversity in schools. 551 U.S. at 789
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
412. See Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation by Income, PEW RES. CTR.
(2012),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/Rise-of-Residential-Income-Segregation2012.2.pdf (discussing the rise of residential segregation by income in the United States); Florence
Goffette-Nagot & Yves Schaeffe, Income Segregation and Suburbanization in France: A Discrete
Choice Approach, GROUPE D’ANALYSE DE THÉORIE ÉCONOMIQUE LYON - ST ÉTIENNE (Mar. 30,
2011), http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/58/11/39/PDF/1112.pdf (discussing residential
segregation by income in France).
413. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803.
414. See RICHARD KAHLENBERG, REWARDING STRIVERS 179 (2010) (advocating a class-based
approach to affirmative action rather than an ethno-race-based focus); RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE
REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 83 (1996) (arguing for class-based affirmative
action); Richard Kahlenberg, Is Affirmative Action Headed Back to the Supreme Court?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (June 21, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/is-affirmative-action-headedback-to-the-supreme-court/29699 (discussing that more people believe they are divided by income and
not race); Richard Kahlenberg, Reactions: Is it Time for Class-Based Affirmative Action?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 16, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Reactions-Is-It-Time-for/62615/ (explaining
the expectation that trends will shift toward income based affirmative action).
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ethno-racial minorities that schools seek to target, 415 a proxy focusing on class is
likely to address the intended groups that a race-conscious affirmative action policy
would also capture. While class-based affirmative action may serve with limited
effectiveness some of the same goals as ethno-race-based programs, it is important
to take care that the outcomes of increased ethno-racial diversity and access to
education for underrepresented minorities are not, ultimately, subordinated. 416
Depending upon the statistics regarding lower income underrepresented minorities
in comparison with lower income whites, programs that only focus on class may
end up primarily benefitting white majority lower-income students. 417 While
alleviating class disparities is also an important objective, it would mean that the
goal of equality in education for certain ethno-racial minorities is once again
thwarted.
B. What Texas’ Approach to Affirmative Action Can Teach France
The history of affirmative action policies in education in the United States
suggests that in order for such policies to have a substantial impact and for the
citizenry to accept them, the policies must be undertaken at the national as well as
local levels. France needs to create national strategies for addressing issues of
ethno-racial exclusion and discrimination.
In the move towards nationalizing affirmative action equal education policies,
France may conclude that the percentage plan offers substantial promise as a
vehicle to increase access to its colleges and universities without explicitly
referencing ethno-racial criteria. The Ten Percent Plan demonstrates that
percentage plans can work to increase the admission of underrepresented ethnoracial minorities to elite academic universities thereby assisting in the process of
equalizing educational opportunities. Not surprisingly, U.S. percentage plans have
already come to the attention of France because of their emphasis on high school
rank and geographic location. 418 Several prominent advocates have lobbied the

415. A recent study by the Pew Research Center reports that the “[m]edian wealth of whites is now
20 times that of black households and 18 times that of Hispanic households.” Sabrina Tavernise,
Recession Study Finds Hispanics Hit the Hardest, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/us/26hispanics.html (citing Paul Taylor et al., Twenty-to-One:
Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, PEW RES. CTR., 5 (July 26,
2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf).
416. Carl Irving, There’s No Valid Surrogate for Race, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & HIGHER
EDUC. (May 1998), http://www.highereducation.org/crosstalk/ct0598/news0598-race.shtml.
417. Numerous scholars in the United States have been critical of adopting class-based approaches
over race-conscious ones. See, e.g., Carson Byrd et al., Class-Based Policies Are Not a Remedy for
Racial Inequality, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 25, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Class-Based Policies-Are-Not-a/129097 (explaining that class cannot serve as a proxy for race and ethnicity).
418. The French-American Foundation, in 2007, sent a special delegation to the United States
charging the participants with the task of learning more about the structure, operation, and success of
percentage plans in California and Texas. The Equality of Opportunity Program Initiative on Selective
Higher Education, FRENCH-AM. FOUND., 1 (2008),
http://www.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/documents/media_reports/percentageplans_brief_en.p
df. The delegation produced a report on their observations and recommendations for France.
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government to adopt percentage plans as part of its project to develop pro-equality
policies. 419 Sarkozy even proposed that for the preparatory courses necessary to
succeed on the concours, and required by some grandes écoles, all students in the
top 5% of their high school classes be admitted to the courses. 420 While this
proposal, if approved, does not entirely address the problem of access to quality
academic institutions at the postsecondary education level, it has the potential to
increase the pool of underrepresented minority candidates for the exclusive
schools. 421 In pursuing this proxy strategy of the percentage plan, in order to
accurately assess whether the outcomes of increased ethno-racial diversity and
access are being met, the government will need to allow for the collection of ethnoracial statistics. Statistical data will help evaluate how the program is impacting the
proxy’s main target population (that is, “students from racial-ethnic or recent
immigrant backgrounds”). 422 Being transparent about the outcomes of an initiative
is important.
Finally, in terms of what lessons the U.S. experience holds for France, just as
France provides the United States with a focal point to view whether the absence of
the formal recognition of ethno-racial categories results in the outcomes desired,
the United States offers an example of whether the use of ethno-racial categories
affords any positives in terms of social policies. For France, Texas’ reintroduction
of ethno-racial criteria is particularly worthy of note.
VII. THE LIMITS OF PROXY STRATEGIES
While I believe proxy strategies should be supported because they have
achieved some positive results regarding the goals of attaining equality of
education in France and the United States, my endorsement is given along with
some caveats and suggestions.
A. The Potential Danger of Disguising Objectives
First, it is critical to be clear in terms of the outcomes being sought and the
rationales underlying the policies implemented. That way, if modifications need to
Promouvoir l’égalité des chances dans l’enseignement supérieur sélectif: l’expérience américaine des
percentage plans et sa pertinence dans le contexte français [Promoting Equal Opportunity in Selective
Higher Education: The American Experience with Percentage Plans and its Relevance for the French
Context], FRENCH-AM. FOUND., 1 (2007),
http://www.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/documents/media_reports/percentageplans_report_fr.p
df.
419. Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Richard François Héran, FRENCH-AM. FOUND., 12 (2010),
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/herantranscript_en.pdf.
420. The Equality of Opportunity Program Initiative on Selective Higher Education, FRENCH-AM.
FOUND., supra note 418, at 1.
421. A future potential avenue may be to introduce a percentage plan that would have a more direct
impact ensuring that a substantial number of underrepresented ethno-racial minorities are actually
granted admission to the elite institutions and not merely admission to the preparatory course needed to
take the exam in order to qualify for admission to the grandes écoles. Id.
422. Id.
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be made in the event the objectives are not being met, there is less of a chance that
the original purposes will be muddled and redirected towards other goals. For
example, if there is a charge, like that of Patricia Ohlendorf’s regarding the Ten
Percent Plan, that an academic institution’s policy is operating in some way to
hinder the number of ethno-racial minorities admitted or that the policy fails to
maintain (or to increase) minority admissions over time, 423 it is less likely that the
original goals (that is, diversity and equal access for underrepresented minorities)
can be supplanted by others or subordinated. The CEP plan is operating on a much
smaller scale than the Texas scheme. It is being administered by an elite school,
rather than on a regional or national level. While the change in scale does not alter
my recommendation of maintaining clarity in the outcomes, the difference in the
application of the Sciences Po’s plan means that there is latitude for the school to
make sure that its objectives (stated and unstated) are met. The problem that I
allude to will become more a reality for France if programs, like the one at the
Sciences Po, are expanded across regions and embraced by the government. Then,
the act of disguising the objectives of ethno-racial diversity and access as ones of
geographic and class diversification will likely limit what programs framed in this
manner can ultimately accomplish.
B. Drawbacks to Relying Upon Socio-Economic and Housing Segregation as
Part of the Solution
Second, it is important not to become complacent with a strategy just because
it yields some positive results. U.S. and French schools and policymakers should
attempt to create alternatives to percentage plans and the CEP initiative that do not
rely upon what may be perceived as a social negative (for example, persistent
socio-economic disparities and housing segregation) for the proxy. Both proxy
strategies depend upon the continuation of ethnically and racially-segregated
housing patterns and, thus, help to legitimate those patterns. 424 Both plans
recognize and play upon the “interdependence” between race, poverty, and
marginalization. 425 As a consequence, even though the schemes are facially neutral
and appear to be egalitarian, the policies are, arguably, complicit in maintaining
continued ethno-racial social fracturing. This is a problem if the United States and
France believe that a healthier society is one that has substantial ethno-racial
interactions and that society should work towards decreasing this type of
segregation. On the other hand, one could argue that to the extent the proxy
strategies improve ethnic and racial social interactions at the college level, and
423. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (No.
11-345), 2012 WL 1882759 (characterizing the statistical gains in diversity attributable to Texas’
percentage plan as “infintesimal” and not narrowly tailored).
424. See Michelle Adams, Isn’t it Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,”
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1730 (2011) (discussing the reality that percentage plans can only have a positive
effect on minority enrollment if housing is firmly segregated).
425. Id. at 1747 (explaining the interdependent relationship between percentage plans and racial
housing segregation); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (1988).
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hopefully later in the employment sector, the good accomplished mitigates any
potential harm.
C. The Problem with Coded Language
Third, while I ultimately weigh in favor of the use of proxy strategies, it is
important to register my uneasiness with the apparent necessity to pursue equality
in education for underrepresented ethno-racial minorities by this surrogate method.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg’s sentiment that transparency is better at
fostering equality of opportunity than programs that operate to “achiev[e] similar
numbers through winks, nods, and disguises” 426 resonates, to some degree, with my
own. My discomfort is related to my position that neither the United States nor
France is experiencing a post-racial historical moment. Residence, the location of
high schools, and economic status can serve as somewhat effective proxies for race
because the societal ill of racism has had a substantial impact on where people live,
attend school, and obtain employment, 427 and because racism still exists. 428 The
proxy is popular, in part, because there is a prevailing denial of the relationship
between race and racism. The proxy allows people to speak in terms of geographic
location and high school rank instead of the uncomfortable language of ethnicity,
race, and racism. The proxy strategy also makes the goals of ethno-racial diversity
and increased access to education more difficult to attain because it is necessary to
continuously come up with coded constructs to do so. 429 The use of coded language
requires vigilant monitoring to ensure that the school’s equity in education and
diversity objectives are being met. 430
CONCLUSION
The question of how to achieve equal access to educational opportunities is
one that continues to be heavily debated. At the time of writing this article the
United States Supreme Court had not yet granted certiorari to hear the Fisher case.
The Court’s agreement to hear the case signals that the American legal landscape is
in flux regarding matters of education and ethno-racial diversity. The Fisher

426. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
427. See N.R. Kleinfield, ‘Why Don’t We Have Any White Kids?,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/education/at-explore-charter-school-a-portrait-of-segregatededucation.html (exploring the persistence of racially segregated schools); Jonathan Roswell, Housing
Costs, Zoning, and Access to High-Scoring Schools, BROOKINGS INST. REP. (April 19, 2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/19-school-inequality-rothwell
(exploring
the
connections between segregated schools, housing, and zoning regulations).
428. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1072 (2010) (discussing racial disparities that result from
continuing patterns of racism).
429. Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 176, at 1622 (discussing Supreme Court rulings that
have enabled policy makers to avoid tackling issues of race and class).
430. Id. (discussing the extra litigation invited by the term diversity, which, in comparison to race,
offers “a distinction without a real difference”).
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decision will dramatically influence the strategies that schools can adopt in
pursuing equality in college admissions. Regardless of the outcome of the case, the
importance of the topic means that the intense polemics will continue. This paper is
essential to the ongoing discussions in that it provides guidance on how to think
through solutions to the issues in different juridical landscapes.
This article critically evaluates and compares two key proxy strategies that
have been adopted by higher education institutions in France and the United States
to achieve ethno-racial diversity and increase educational opportunities for
underrepresented minorities. It further examines the legal environments in which
the strategies arose. The histories of the United States and France concerning
certain ethno-racial minorities require that both countries move beyond the
emphasis on formal equality in order to extend to those minorities substantial and
meaningful opportunities to attend quality post-secondary education institutions.
The United States’ troubled history is defined by slavery, de jure and de facto
segregation, and the marginalization of racial minorities, in particular, African
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. Similarly, in France, the history of
slavery in the empire and colonization of parts of Africa are at the root of many
current issues plaguing the nation regarding the African French minority
population. These oppressive histories must be taken into account when
formulating education policies.
Recent events in France suggest that now more than ever it is open to finding
ways of fully including ethno-racial minorities (e.g., the African French population)
into mainstream French society. The government and academic institutions, like the
Sciences Po, are appropriately focusing on the key areas of education, employment,
and government as crucial sectors that if opened up will help pave the way towards
bringing France more in conformity with its egalitarian ideals. Despite the
shortcomings and the fact that the scale of the Sciences Po’s CEP program cannot
adequately address the enormity of the problem, the school’s effort is a crucial step
towards tackling the current socio-economic inequities that the African French
community is experiencing. The CEP program is one that should be expanded and
serve as a model for other equalizing initiatives in French society.
In Texas the Ten Percent Plan performed the critical role of permitting Texas
colleges and universities to maintain minority student admissions during precarious
times; however, the constraints of the program mean that it ultimately stymies
progress towards the goal of attaining and improving access to post-secondary
institutions for underrepresented minorities. The University of Texas’ reliance upon
a mix of strategies (ethno-racial criteria and the percentage plan) offers a more
effective approach for wrestling with the challenging issues of access and equality
of educational opportunity and, as such, should be considered by other jurisdictions
and countries, including France.
The overall lesson for both the United States and France is to continue to be
nimble and flexible in devising ways to address the challenging issue of equal
educational opportunity and to remember that if groups of people experience de
facto ethno-racial discrimination and marginalization, the methods proposed for
countering this experience cannot wholly rely upon so-called “race-neutral” criteria
because the substantive harms, including denial of a valuable life-changing
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education, will be obscured by a dazzling cloak of formal equality.
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CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL
DECISION 2001-450 DC, July 11, 2001, Rec. 82 431
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL . . .
31. Considering that paragraph I of article 14 of the referred law
adds . . . to the Education Code an article L. 621-3, which provides:
“The governing board of the Institute of Political Studies of Paris
may determine, by derogation from the provisions of the third
paragraph of article L. 612-3, the conditions and procedures for
admission to the Institute’s programs as well as the organization of
its programs of study for the first cycles of its doctoral program. It
may adopt admissions procedures that include particular modalities
aimed at assuring the recruitment of a diverse student body from
among undergraduate students. The admissions procedures may be
implemented by way of agreements concluded with French or
foreign secondary or higher educational institutions, in order to
involve them in the Institute’s recruitment of their pupils or
students”;
32. Considering that, according to paragraph 13 of the Preamble of
the Constitution 1946: “The Nation guarantees equal access for
children and adults to instruction, vocational training and culture . .
.”;
33. Considering that, even if it is permissible for the legislature to
derogate from the provisions of the third paragraph of article L. 612
– 3 of the Education Code for the purpose of allowing diversification
of access of undergraduate students to the Institute’s programs, it is
only on the condition that the particular modalities that the governing
board of the Institute establishes, subject to judicial review, are based
on objective criteria of a nature to guarantee respect for the
constitutional requirement of equal access to education; that, with
this reservation, article 14 conforms to the Constitution . . . .

431. Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC, supra note 28.
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